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ABSTRACT
The Institutional Control o f NCAA  
Division One Collegiate Athletics
by
Burton L. Easley
Dr. Anthony Saville, Examination Committee Chair 
Professor o f Education 
University o f Nevada. Las Vegas
The control of collegiate athletics has been a matter of concern since the earliest 
days o f college sports competition. In 1952. the National Collegiate Athletic Association 
instituted policies that included the ability to impose sanctions on colleges that violated 
recruiting guidelines, eligibility requirements, and other rules. Its lack of iny estigative 
and policing resources, hoyvever. left the NC.AA with limited ability to enforce these 
policies. As a result, the organization placed the responsibility for control o f institutional 
athletics on the school itself and its chief executive officer based on the reasoning that 
many problems involving violations o f regulations yvould be solved yyithout intery ention 
by the NCAA if  a school's administration is in control o f athletics.
Scandals surrounding intercollegiate athletics and the issuance of a number of 
citations by the NC.AA against Division I institutions for lack of institutional control are 
raising senous questions about the present status and effectiveness of self-governance 
and control o f collegiate athletics. The purpose of this study was to determine the status
iii
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of institutional control o f athletics programs at NCAA Division I colleges and 
uni\ ersities by identify ing the le\ els and ways in which control was exercised and to 
determine where problems with control lay This was done by surveying the athletics 
directors and chief executive officers o f the 275 NCAA Division I colleges and 
universities
The results o f the surv ey and the implications o f them are presented in this 
document, also presented are recommendations for changes in policy, procedures, and 
attitudes in order to improve the degree of institutional control of athletics at NCAA 
Division I intercollegiate athletic institutions and suggestions for further study of the 
topic.
IV
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION  
The Problem
On June 12, 1995, the cover o f Sports Illustrated carried the headline, "WTiy the 
Univ ersity o f Miami Should Drop Football.” The accompanying article. "Broken Beyond 
Repair." by Alexander Wolff, took the form of an open letter to the school's president. 
Edward Foote II. urging him to eliminate the university's famous football program m 
order to salvage the school’s reputation as a place o f higher learning. W olff cited 
offenses on the part of individual athletes that included disorderly conduct, shoplifting, 
drunken dnving. burglary, arson, assault, and sexual battery
An earlier article which had appeared in the Miami Herald o f May 18 had 
reported that. "No fewer than one of every seven scholarship play ers on last season's 
team has been arrested.. ." According to Wolff, abuses were not limited to the athletes. 
Problems involving employ ees included fraud with the Pell Grant Program, drug abuse, 
drunken driving, and reckless dri\ ing.
With the National Collegiate .Athletic Association ( NCA.A i tagging the University 
of Miami with the charge o f lack o f institutional control, W olff called on the school's 
president to summon the courage to defy the board o f trustees, the alumni, and the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
boosters and shut down the football program. .As precedent. WoItTcited examples of 
presidents o f other schools such as the University of Chicago. University o f San 
Francisco, and Tulane University who had already dropped major athletics programs.
The issue o f control of collegiate athletics is not a new one. It has been an 
ongoing, persistent concern of college and university presidents at NCA.A member 
institutions since the earliest day s of college sports competition i ACE Report. 1952: 
Cohen &  March. 1974: Frey. 1982: Guttman. 1988: Hanford, 1976: Hardy& Berryman. 
1982: Hart-Nibbrig. 1989: knight Commission. 1991: Rooney. 1980: Sack. 1982:
Sav age, 1929: Smith, 1988: Thelin. 1989. 1994). From the time when Yale and Harvard 
first competed in the sport of rowing in 1864. university presidents hav e struggled w ith 
the issue of the control o f athletics (Guttman. 1978).
Criticism has also been ever present: it has pervaded college and university sports 
since before the turn of the century and continues today ( Andre &  James. 1991: Farrell. 
1989: Fleisher. 1992: Guttman. 1982: Hardy &  Berry man. 1982: Hart-Nibbng &  
Cottingham. 1989: Lawrence, 1987. Lucas &  Smith. 1978: Wheeler. 1996). 
.Administrators from around the country continue to question the relationship between 
athletics and academics: some believe that the abuses created by the entertainment v alue 
of a successful athletics program have turned academic institutions into nothing less than 
professional amusement centers (Frey. 1982: Funk. 1991: Lucas & Smith. 1978: Mallett 
&  Howard. 1992. Nelson. 1982: Smith. 1988: Thelin. 1989, 1994) Despite the 
problems, howev er, many still feel that the benefits of intercollegiate athletics programs 
outwemh the drawbacks as lone as cheatinu. uamblinu. and recruitment irreuulanties do
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
not sacrifice the integrity of the university (Andre &  James. 1991: Guttman. 1988: Lucas 
&  Smith. 1978: Simon. 1985. 1991. Thelin. 1989»,
In the early 195(J's. the American Council on Education (.ACE), a large 
association of colleges and universities, considered the possibility of de-emphasizing 
athletics. The discussion was generated by the numerous scandals that tainted many of 
the athletic programs at that time (Farrell. 1989: Robert &  Olson. 1989: Stem. 1979. 
Thelin, 1994). Consequently , in 1952. the NC A.A. as the rule-making body of 
intercollegiate sport, instituted policies that included the ability to impose sanctions upon 
colleges that violated recruiting guidelines, eligibility requirements, and other rules.
Unfortunately, NCAA attempts at controlling intercollegiate athletics have had 
results that are mixed, at best. The primary reason for this is that the resources 
designated for enforcement have been minimal. Without an adequate number o f 
personnel to investigate possible infractions, the probability of deterring over 900 
NC.A.A members from violating NC.A.A rules has been limited (Chu, 1982).
Significance of the Study 
Because of its lack o f inv estigative and policing resources, the NC.A.A established 
a set o f principles of gov ernance that placed the responsibility for control on the 
institution and its chief operating officer. The organization's reasoning was that many of 
the problems inv olv ing v iolations of regulations would be solved without intervention by 
the NC.AA if  a school’s administration is in control o f  athletics (D. Taitt. NCA.A 
Enforcement Office, personal communication, 1995 >. Many from outside o f the NC.A.A 
hav e also called for stronuer control over intercolleuiate athletic ( Andre & James. 1991 :
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Malien &  Howard. l^Q]: Thelm. 1989: Sack. 1989,. The pnnciples o f msiitutional 
control as prepared b\ the NC.A.A Committee on Infractions i |996i are:
I The NC.AA rules applicable to each operation are readily available to 
those persons involved in that operation
2. .Appropriate forms are provided to persons involved in specific operations 
to ensure that they will properly follow NC.AA rules.
3. A procedure is established for timely communication among various 
university offices regarding determinations that affect compliance with 
NC.AA rules
4. Meaningful compliance education programs are prov ided for personnel 
engaged in athletics-related operations.
5 Informational and educational programs are established to inform
athletics boosters o f the limitations on their activ ities under NC.A.A rules 
and of penalties that can anse against the institutions if  the boosters are 
responsible for rule v iolations
6. Intbmiational and educational programs are established for student-
athletes regarding he rules that they must follow.
7 An internal monitonng system is in place to ensure compliance with
NC.A.A rules.
8. An external audit o f athletics compliance is undertaken at reasonable
intervals
9 The chief executive officer and other senior administrators make clear
that they demand compliance with NCAA rules and that they will not
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tolerate those who deliberately violate the rules or do so through gross 
negligence
10 The institution and its staff members have a long history o f self-detecting- 
self-reporting. and self-investigating o f all potential violations.
The NC.AA Enforcement Office started keeping records of v iolations o f the 
NC.A.A Rule Book on October 16. 1952. It has recorded 96 cases w hich hav e included 
citations against schools for lack o f institutional control. Fifty-five of these have 
involved Division I institutions and have taken place just since 1980 (NCA.A 
Enforcement Summarv. 1995 ).
Scandals inv olving athletics have taken place at a number of colleges. These hav e 
involved such infractions as altered transcripts, shadow courses requinng no attendance 
by athletes, slush funds for athletics personnel, secret contracts, and the use o f 
professionals posing as amateurs i Hardy & Berryman. 1982). These cases have raised 
serious questions about the present status and effectiveness of self-governance and 
institutional control of collegiate athletics.
Statement of Purpose
The purpose of this investigation was to determine the current status o f 
institutional control of athletics programs at NCAA Division 1 colleges and univ ersities 
by identifying the levels and the ways in which control was exercised and to determine 
w here problems with control lie This was done through the use of a surv ey designed to 
collect information pertaining to the individual elements and conditions that have been 
determined to impact on self-governance.
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Conceptual Framework 
The NC.AA is unable to police athletics b\ itself because of the limited resources 
o f Its enforcement office: therefore, it must rely on each institution to police itself 
.Accordingly , the NC.A.A Manual ( 1996-97) specifically states that it is the responsibility 
of each member institution to control its intercollegiate athletics program in compliance 
w ith the rules and regulations of the association.
The ultimate responsibility for institutional control is placed by the NCAA on the 
school’s chief executn e officer. This is reasonable since a primary function o f any CEO 
IS that of control (Mintzberg. 1975): the objective of that control is to assure proper 
performance in accordance with established plans (Flippo &  Munsinger. 1978). Thus, 
the NC.AA Manual ( 1996-97 ) states that it is a school’s chief executive officer who is 
responsible for the administration o f all aspects of the athletics program, including 
approval o f the budget and audit of all expenditures
The concept o f institutional control is of primary importance to the NC.A.A’s 
ability to regulate college sports due to its inability to police athletics itself. .According 
to Dirk Taitt in the NC.AA Enforcement Office, many of the violations of NC.A.A rules 
hav e come from schools that have not been in control of their athletics program. If  a 
school’s administration controls athletics, rather than the athletics department controlling 
the institution. Taitt says, many of the problems will be solved without intervention by 
the NC.A.A i personal communication. 1995).
Elements to be Investigated 
The institutional control of athletics is complicated by the often conflicting goals
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7and philosophies of students, coaches, faculty, administrators, alumni, and the general 
public (Frey. 1982: Fisher. 1984» .Although the ultimate responsibility lies with a single 
person, the CEO. control is inevitably impacted by other issues and by other parties and 
entities both within and outside o f the university Primary among these are the 
institution’s governing board, its athletics director, its alumni and athletics boosters, and 
ev en the financial and operational policies o f the school. V\'ith that in mind, the 
following questions served as a basis for the collection and analy sis o f data;
1. To what degree and with what strategies was control exercised by the 
chief executive officer of the institution’’
2. In what way s and to what extent was institutional control facilitated or
inhibited by the governing board o f the institution’’
3. In what way s did financial and operational policies o f the institution
influence and affect control o f athletics ’
4 In what ways were athletics directors involved in the institution's control
of athletics?
5. In what ways were the school's boosters and alumni affecting the
institution’s control o f athletics?
Methodology
.A questionnaire was dev eloped which was composed of eight sections, the first 
section requested demographic data while the remaining sections sought in-depth 
descriptions of institutional control o f indiv idual athletics programs. The combination of 
yes-and-no questions. Likert-scale questions, and open-ended questions relating to
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
sinstitutional control served as a basis for qualitative measures to analyze the existence of 
institutional control o f athletics programs The population selected to receive the survey 
instrument consisted o f the chief executive officer and the athletics director at NCAA 
Div ision 1 institutions.
Delimitations of the Study
This study was limited to the chief executive officer and the athletics director of 
each of the 275 NC.AA Division 1 colleges and universities listed in the 1996 97 National 
Directory o f College .Athletics Not included in the study were those institutions in 
NCAA Divisions II and III. junior colleges, and NAIA institutions which set different 
standards. Faculty .Athletics Representatives were not included in the survey. No 
attempt was made to ensure that the controls claimed by the chief executiv e officers and 
the athletics directors actually existed.
Definition o f Terms
Athletics Advisorv Board: A board which has either controlling or advisory status 
of intercollegiate athletics at each member institution. This ty pe of board with its 
responsibility for advising or establishing athletics policies and making policy decisions 
IS not required by the NC.A.A.
.Athletics Certification-External Peer Review : .A program of w hich the central 
purpose is to v alidate the fundamental integrity o f the athletics programs of each member 
institution through a verified and evaluated institutional self-study. The cenification 
program is carefully designed with peer rev iewers who are external to the institution 
under e.xaniination and who verify that the self-study process is characterized by
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campus-wide panicipation and that the self-study report reflects accurately the operation 
o f the athletics program
Authority Tlie capacity to ev oke compliance in others on the basis o f formal 
position and of any psy chological inducements, rewards, or sanctions that may 
accompany formal power (Presthus. I9&2. p 123)
Chief Executive Officer (CEO ): The administrator designated to be responsible 
for all that transpires within the institution. A member institution's chief executive 
officer has ultimate responsibility and final authority for the conduct of the 
intercollegiate athletics program and the actions o f any board in control of that program 
Faculty Athletics Representative: An individual designated by the institution who 
must be a member of the institution’s faculty or an administrator who holds faculty rank 
but who does not hold an administrative or coaching position in the athletics department. 
Duties o f the faculty athletics representative are determined by the institution.
Governance: Schenkel (1971) defines governance as the process of decision 
making, the designation of participants in this process, the structure that relates these 
indiv iduals to one another, the effort that is or should be made to ensure that decisions 
are carried out. and the assessment of the results that are achieved as a consequence of 
those decisions. Corson ( 1975 ) adds that gov ernance describes the process o f deciding 
and of seeing to it that the decisions are executed. Fry er and Lov as ( 199ü) state that 
gov emance
comprises the institution’s structures and processes for decision making and the 
communication related to those structures and processes. The definition of The Carnegie 
Foundation for the .Adv ancement of Teachinu ( 1982) includes not onlv the formal
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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arrangements by which colleges and universities carry on their work, but also the 
informal procedures by which standards are maintained. They also include in their 
definition those forces bey ond the campus that shape the policies of higher education and 
to which the academy must ultimately respond.
Gov erning Board The entity w hose function is to act as the guardian of the 
charter of an institution and to act as the body in which ultimate authority over the 
institution is vested (Schenkel, 1971 ).
Institutional Control: The control and responsibility for the conduct o f 
intercollegiate athletics that is exercised by the institution itself and by the conference, if  
any. of which it is a member: it is constituted of administrative control or faculty control 
or a combination o f the two ( NCA.A Manual. 1994-95).
National Colleuiate .Athletic Association (NCAAi: A pnvate. non-profit 
association organized in 1905. consisting o f approximately 903 active member 
institutions. Membership is open to four-year institutions which meet specified 
academic standards. The NCAA operates under a constitution and by -laws adopted by 
the membership and subject to amendment by the membership at annual conv entions 
Headquartered in Shawnee Mission, Kansas, it employs a professional staff o f about 80 
w ho execute NCAA policy under the superv ision of an executiv e director ( Greene.
1984).
NC.A.A Div ision l-.A: One of three divisions into which NCAA institutions are 
grouped depending on stadium size, number of sports offered, average attendance, 
scholarships available, and other specifications. Division l-.A includes about 275 larger 
institutions.
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II
Power McGrath ( 1971 ). in Power and Authority. stated that power refers to the 
ability o f various individuals and groups in the academic community to control the 
policy-making processes through specifically vested or delegated authority or through 
influence acquired by mere force of circumstance i p 1871. Fisher 1 19841 concluded that 
power is the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to 
carry out his own will despite resistence. regardless o f the basis on which this probability 
rests" ( p. 28). Bierstadt (1966) said that power is the ability to employ force while 
Kanter ( 1996» said simply that power is the ability to get things done ( 1996, p. 2U).
Summary
Relevant literature is reviewed in the next chapter: the third chapter contains 
information about the methodology used for this study including questionnaire 
dev elopment and methods o f data analysis. Surv ey results are reported in the fourth 
chapter, and conclusions and recommendations for future research are formulated in the 
last chapter.
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CHAPTER 2
HISTORICAL VIEW  OF GOVERNANCE &  INSTITUTIONAL CONTROL 
OF COLLEGE ATHLETICS IN THE UNITED STATES
Early History
Collegiate athletics appeared in the early nineteenth centur\ as unorganized 
student acti\ities which were not considered to be a meaningful part o f campus life 
(Hardy &  Berryman. 1982. Lewis. 197Ua: Lucas &  Smith. 1978» These extracurricular 
activities were bom out o f the students’ need for something to reliev e the monotony and 
dullness o f their school work I Chapman 1978: Cutting, 1871: Smith. 1988». Nothing 
existed in the way of structured control by students, and. although some rough and 
Mgorous activities drew the attention of college authorities, the games were not subject 
to university leadership ( Chu. 1982: Fleisher. 1992: Forum. 1894: Hardy &  Berryman.
1982 ». In addition, no rules or regulations had been created for the games ( Falla. 1981: 
Nelson. 1982 ». As a result, it was quite common for a football player, for instance, to 
compete in two or three different games representing different collegiate teams dunng a 
single weekend I Falla. 1981: Farrell. 1989: Fleisher. 1992: Lucas & Smith. 1978: 
Roonev. 1980: Slauuhter. 1989».
12
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Student-Controlled Sports 
B\ the late nineteenth century. sports had become more accepted as an intramural 
activ ity connected to the university i kett, 1977 >. Student-run organizations and the 
students themselves took responsibility for the governance of these early college spons 
(Andre &  James. 1991: Baker. 1982. Byers. 1995: Fleisher. 1992: G off 1988: Guttman. 
1982. 1991. Hardy &  Berry man. 1982. Lawrence. 1987: Nelson. 1982: Sage. W9ü: 
Slaughter, 1989). The missions o f the student organizations which controlled sports were 
to sponsor and conduct championship competitions, to establish play ing rules, and to 
determine eligibility cntena (Hardy & Berry man ». Student athletic associations also 
provided financial assistance and moral support for college athletes (Smith. 1988).
Because these student governing bodies were usually sport-specific, regulations 
differed from sport to sport ( Nelson. 1982: Smith. 1988) .Also, since these organizations 
were operated by volunteers, the inherent turnover made them short-lived ( Hardy &  
Berryman. 1982: Nelson i The lack of uniform rules and the inconsistency of leadership 
due to turnov er resulted in a call for more controlled adult superv ision by univ ersity 
leadership iChu. 1982: Nelson).
Eventually the athletic associations encompassed all sports in the school ( Smith.
19881. Harvard's athletic association was organized in 1874 and was followed by ones at 
Princeton. Rutgers, and Michigan in 1876. As the mov ement spread southward and 
westward, associations were established at Missouri in 1886. at Duke in 1887. at 
Stant'ord in 1891. and at Oregon in 1893 ( Smith).
The first intercollegiate contest was a crew race between Harvard and \  ale. 
taking place at Lake Winnepeasaukee in New Hampshire, on .August 3, 1852 (.Andre &
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James. 1991: Guttman. 1988; Hardy & Berry man. 1982: Hart-Nibbrig. 1989: Lawrence. 
1987; Lewis. 1967: Lucas &  Smith. 1978: Noverr. 1983. Rooney. 1980: Sage. 199(j: 
Smith. 1988: WTtiton. 1852) The Yale faculty banned contests for the next two years 
I Lucas &  Smith ). By the second boat race in 1855. the need for some form o f control 
and governance became an issue for the first time (Lewis, 1967: Lucas &  Smith. 1978. 
Sage. 1990. Savage, 1929. Smith, 1988, Stem. 1979). Vale believed that because the 
Harvard coxswain had graduated, he should not be eligible to compete in the race. 
However, because the contest was organized completely by students and had no 
formulated rules nor eligibility standards. Yale had no one appeal to (Hardy &
Berryman. 1982: Lucas &  Smith, 1978: Savage, 1929; Stem. 1979 )
Because each college had its own rules goveming athletics, the first 
intercollegiate event pointed out. according to Hardy and Berryman ( 1982 ). that the 
reasons for gov emance are the needs for rules o f play, eligibility of play ers, and 
recognition of a champion. Beginning with the collegiate event between Harv ard and 
\'ale. conflicts arose when the regulations of one college gave it an athletic advantage 
over another (Smith. 1988).
It was from this impetus that the first intercollegiate goveming body emerged at a 
meeting in New Haven, and the College Union Regatta o f Brown. Harv ard. Tnnity. 
Columbia . Dartmouth and Yale was formed in 1858 ( Guttman. 1988: Hardy &
Berry man. 1982. Lucas & Smith, 1978). From this meeting a set o f rules gov eming 
future races between the institutions was agreed upon ( Hardy & Berryman. 1982: Sage.
1990)
Early athletics were often carried out over the objections o f faculty who saw sport
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as distracting from the real work of the college ( Davenport. 1985. Thelm. 1989).
Indeed, the game o f football in the early twentieth century had evolved into a v iolent 
game with injury and even death becoming commonplace i Falla. 1981 : Farrell, 1989; 
Fleisher. 1992: Slaughter. 1989) The first intercollegiate football game was played on 
November 6th, 1869, between Princeton and Rutgers at Rutgers field in New Brunswick, 
New Jersey ( Falla. 1981: Farrell. 1989. Funk. 1991: Lawrence, 1987. Nov err. 1983: 
Rooney . 1980: Sage. 1990: Slaughter. 1989: Thelm. 1989).
The intercollegiate sport o f football highlighted the difficulty o f student 
gov emance. In 1873. representatives o f teams from Princeton. Rutgers. Yale and 
Columbia agreed to play the game of football like soccer {Falla. 1981: Fleisher. 1992: 
Lucas &  Smith. 1978: Smith. 1988). Harv ard, w hich had not attended the meeting in 
w hich this agreement was reached, decided to play the game in the rugby sty le o f play 
and became isolated from the other schools ( Falla. 1981: Fleisher. 1992: Lucas &  Smith. 
1978) However, after Harvard played a rugby style rules game with Mcgill University of 
Montreal, Canada on May 14th. 1874. a group of spectating Pnnceton students 
encouraged a meeting between Princeton, Harvard. Yale and Columbia recommending 
the adoption o f this new style
The subsequent meeting on November 23. 1876. at the Maced Hotel in 
Springfield. Massachusetts, resulted in the formation o f the Intercollegiate Football 
.Association (Baker. 1982: Falla. 1981. Fleisher, 1992: Guttman. 1978: Hardy &
Berryman. 1982: Han-Nibbrig &  Cottingham, 1989: Lawrence. 1987: Never. 1983: 
Rooney. I98U. Smith. 1988). Yale, however, refused to join the student-run 
Intercolleuiate Football Association It took three vears before Yale was broiuiht into the
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organization b\ the persuasions of its football captain. Walter Camp (Falla. 19811.
The organization succeeded in adopting 0 1 rules, only two of w hich concerned 
safety (Florrow. 1982: Lawrence. 1987i. Unfortunately, brutality intensified under the 
new Intercollegiate Football .Association (Smith. 1988). As football became more 
popular, the violence on the field escalated (Falla. 1981 ) By 1884, football had become 
so violent that the football team at Harvard was ordered to disband. .Army and Navy 
discontinued their series the same year due to v iolence on the field ( Falla, 1981 : Smith.
1988).
Following the season of 1887. the Intercollegiate Football .Association passed a 
radical rule that nearly assured mass plays and increased charges o f brutality (Smith.
1988 ) The association, under the leadership o f Walter Camp of Yale, ruled that tackling 
below the waist to the knees would be allowed for the first time. The Univ ersity of 
Pennsy lvania and Wesleyan withdrew from the association because they opposed the 
new mass play and eligibility rules (Lawrence, 1987). Harvard and Columbia withdrew 
m 1889 over a dispute inv olving the eligibility o f players ( Falla. 1981. Lawrence. 1987: 
Smith, 1988). In 1894. with only Yale and Princeton remaining in the organization, the 
Intercollegiate Football Association disbanded ( Fleisher. 1992. Lawrence. 1987)
In 1894, the University Athletic Club of New York attempted to fill the void and 
asked Harvard. Yale. Pnnceton. and Penn to form a new rules committee (Falla, 1981. 
Fleisher. 1992. Lawrence. 1982: Stagg, 1946). W alter Camp of Yale was made secretary 
and the organization instituted safer rules eliminating mass momentum plays (Smith.
1988) Howev er, the new rules committee proved helpless in eliminating interschool 
squabbling and the brutality in football iFalla, 1981: Fleisher, 1992). .After a violent
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game between Harvard and  ^ale. Harv ard split from Yale again and joined Penn and 
Comell to form their own rules-making body (Lawrence. 1987. Smith, 19881. The 
eastern schools came under fire at this time from .Amos Alonzo Stagg. athletics director 
o f the University of Chicago, for not creating one set o f rules (Smith. 1988).
In 1895. sensing that Stagg and other Big Ten schools might create another set of 
rules goveming football, the large schools in the east again formed a rules-making body 
called the Football Rules Committee (Fleisher. 1992). Writh the Football Rules 
Committee, an athletic association became alumni controlled for the first time (Smith.
1988 ). Unfortunately. to pass a rule or to change an existing rule, all participants had to 
agree (Fleisher. 1992). Because schools which benefitted from violent tactics on the 
field could use a veto to overturn any rule that would adversely affect their ability to use 
these techniques, the Football Rules Committee also failed in quelling the level o f 
violence in college sports ( Fleisher. 1992: Smith. 1988).
Intercollegiate sports during the late ISOO's was developed almost exclusively by 
student leadership ( Lucas &  Smith. 1978: Sage. 1990 ). Despite the importance o f the 
student athletic associations, it was still the task o f the individual sport's captain to solve 
problems and ensure the continuance of the sports (Lucas &  Smith. 1978: Smith. 1988). 
Flovvever. student mismanagement, interschool squabbling, and v iolence and bmtality on 
the field, in conjunction with a growing popularity o f campus sports ev entually led to the 
American college taking its students’ athletic activ ities within its formal control and 
financial structure ( Chu. 1982 ). Against the backdrop o f interschool squabbling and 
violence m sport, organizational initiatives began to emerge (Fleisher. 1992).
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Faculty and Alumni Control
The record o f faculty govemance. according to Thelm ( 1994». has been weak. 
Traditionally adv isory rather than regulatory , separately incorporated athletics 
associations alway s precluded faculty ov ersight Lawrence ( 1987 » felt that faculty 
purposefully kept aloof from athletic issues and that this lack of faculty influence 
partially explains the abuses that marred the early period o f intercollegiate football.
.At the time athletic departments were forming, college presidents were in tune 
with matenalism and took the approach that athletics advertised the university and 
directly correlated with increased enrollment (Thelm. 1989). They became active 
marketing agents for athletics, attending games, speaking to v ictonous teams, and 
soliciting funds from alumni and boards o f trustees, w hile the institutions began to 
prov ide money for teams, absorb their debts, and grant scholarships. In addition, they 
often sided against the faculty regarding the issue o f the development o f athletics (Gilley 
&  Hickey . 1986).
Dunng the late ISOO's. faculty and alumni sought increased participation in the 
govemance o f athletics as student control declined (Hardy &  Berryman. 1982. Slaughter,
1989). Administrators, however, felt that a campus-controlled program would pose 
fewer administrative problems than would a program operated by ofT-campus groups 
including alumni and politically onented interests (Nelson, 1982: Sage. 199u).
Eventually the faculty attempted to take the student-run athletic programs and place them 
under what they believed to be sounder educational control ( Lucas &  Smith, 1978). As 
educators began to accept athletics as an integral part o f collegiate life, if  not actually a
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part of the curriculum, they began to feel that they should exert greater control over its 
negative aspects
The first faculty athletic committees were formed at Princeton Univ ersity in 1881 
and at Harv ard in 1882 with the purpose o f holding in check the excesses of athletics and 
to veto those aspects o f sports that were deemed harmful ( Hardy &  Berry man. 1982. 
Lucas & Smith, 1978. Sargent. 1910: Smith. 1988) The Harv ard committee soon 
stopped competition against professional teams and also forbid the hiring of professional 
coaches The first action o f the Princeton committee was to propose a list o f regulations 
emphasizing the time and place of contests. The Princeton faculty. keeping a close 
watch over its athletic committee, continued to add responsibilities to the committee's 
regulatory functions (Smith. 1988).
Faculties everywhere by the end o f the century had formed athletic committees in 
an attempt to prevent football and other sports from encroaching upon academic 
interests. The faculty committees were specifically concerned with abuses related to 
athletics including: ta) growing professionalism including the practices o f hiring coaches 
and recruiting athletes. (b i increasing size and management o f finances, (c) lack of 
sponsmanship. ( d ) glontlcaiion of athletics over academics, and (e) derivative evils such 
as drunkenness and gambling i Hardy & Berryman. 1982: Smith. 1988)
.According to Smith ( 1988), friction dev eloped between the faculty committee and 
the students at Harv ard over the control o f athletics when the committee dismissed the 
successful, paid crew coach. William Bancroft, in 1884 The committee pressured the 
editorial stafT o f the student newspaper into not publishing negativ e letters o f former 
crew captains regarding the incident. This discord between faculty and students spilled
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over into football as the faculty committee criticized the sport as being brutal and 
extremely dangerous. The entire faculty at Harvard concurred with the committee when 
it suggested to the president that football be prohibited. Faculty complained that the 
number of athletic contests disturbed serious academic work: they objected to the 
ungentlemanly behav ior and the unhealthy moral influences of big city games. They 
protested against the brutality and the resulting injuries, against the use financial 
inducements to attend college, and against the waste and extravagance taking place under 
student management.
As Harv ard's students and alumni became increasingly critical of the faculty 
committee. President Elliot decided to form a new committee that included both students 
and alumni as well as faculty (Smith, 1988). The new committee recommended a 
resumption of the sport of football the following year.
Harvard was not the only school to have problems with student-controlled spons 
The president of Nonhvvestem vvTote that many students "seemed to think that the 
university was meddling with matters that did not properly come with its jurisdiction"
( Smith. 1988, p. 131). Bun W ilder. a professor at Cornell, felt that Cornell should be 
the first institution to issue a "declaration of independence from the existing 
athletocracv" ( Nonhvvestem University President's Annual Repon. 1895-96. p. 5. Smith.
1988. p. 132 ). Despite this view , with the growth o f athletics, it became increasingly 
difficult for even an entire faculty to attempt to control athletics ( Lucas &  Smith. 1978 ).
The alumni, even before they gained an official voice on many of the college 
athletic committees as they had at Harvard, had acquired some control over a number of 
athletics programs, they often assisted coaches and the expense of running a program
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often required alumni financial help as well ( Lucas &  Smith. 1978). Their additional 
involvement ot serv ing on athletic committees would, they claimed, establish continuity 
and would compensate for the inexperience of the students ( Hardy &  Berry man. 1982: 
Lewis. 1965)
In reality , the financial support brought by alumni often translated into alumni 
governance) Schenkel. 1971: Smith. 1988). .At Dartmouth College in 1892. for example, 
the Board o f Trustees placed an unsuccessful athletics department under the control o f an 
alumni athletic committee. Successful teams followed this move and, despite some 
attempts, the faculty at Dartmouth were unsuccessful in regaining control.
By the 1900 s, both students and faculties had seen their powers diminish (Hardy 
&  Berryman. 1982: Sage. 1990: Smith. 1988). The loss o f faculty control and the 
emergence of alumni control was typical, according to Walter Schenkel (1971). of the 
American univ ersity at the turn of the century This was due in part to faculty lack of 
interest and also to the emergence of powerful trustees and alumni. As students had lost 
their freedom to manage athletic contests w ithout interference from faculty and others, 
indiv idual colleges increasingly lost control of athletics to outside forces. The mov ement 
toward inter-institutional control had begun.
The Brown Conference
When the student-controlled, interschool associations failed to create a uniform 
standard o f rules and to solve the problem of v iolence in sport, a meeting was planned to 
discuss these issues. A group made up o f faculty , alumni, and undergraduate 
representativ es from seven schools met in Prov idence. Rhode Island, on February 18.
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! 898 ( Smith. 1988 ). .At the meeting, referred to as the Brown Conference, the group 
appointed a standing committee made up of faculty members to continue the work begun 
at the conference. Ov er the next few months, this committee created a strongly worded 
report calling for cooperative action to cure the ev ils o f intercollegiate sports. The repon 
included guidelines for intercollegiate athletics that were not accepted immediately. but 
which were all eventually affirmed, one by one. over the years These initial guidelines 
stated that;
( 11 Each institution should form an athletic committee w ith faculty
representation;
( 2 ) The athletic committee would approve all coaches, trainers, captains, and 
team managers;
13 ) No athletic competition would take place without athletic committee
approval:
(4 1 .Any student participation in more than one sport would require athletic
committee approval:
( 5 1 The athletic committee would ensure that all athletes were bona tide
members o f the institution ( Smith, 1988. p. 140)
In ensunng that only bona tide members o f an institution competed in 
intercollegiate athletics, the Brown Conference made an early attempt at establishing 
eligibility guidelines Qualifications for eligibility required that:
( a ) Only students in good academic standing would be eligible to participate
I b ) Special or part-time students could not participate until they had attended
colleue for one vear.
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( c I Students deficient in studies in one univ ersity department could not
participate in athletics if they transferred to another department in the 
same university .
id) No student admitted without passing the university entrance examination
or by merely conv incing gov erning authorities that he was capable of 
doing a full y ear's work would be eligible for athletics.
<e) Students should be allowed only four years o f eligibility.
( f) Only freshmen would be allowed to participate on freshman teams
(g) No freshman could participate on both the freshman and varsity teams
( Smith 1988. p 143).
Smith (1988) also reported that besides establishing general guidelines o f play 
and eligibility. the committee set guidelines for practices, contests, and amateur status 
For practice, the committee recommended that teams were not to practice during college 
vacations except for the ten days prior to the opening o f the fall term: all contests were to 
be held on college grounds: and students of the competing colleges were to be given 
preference in the allotment o f seats at contests. In regard to amateur status, the 
committee proposed that no student could participate in athletics if  he had previously 
played for money , all contests were to be held on college grounds, and no student would 
be eligible for athletics i f  he receiv ed board free at special dining facilities for athletes or 
i f  he owed money for training table meals.
Essentially. the faculty-controlled committee wanted to keep athletics from 
interfenng with the mental and moral training of the students i Smith. 1988 ) Flovvever. 
this did not sit well either with students or with some faculty members. Students enjoyed
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the growing popularity of intercollegiate sports: at the same time, alumni, college towns 
and communities, and some faculty members liked watching the events.
The Brown Conference, though well intentioned. was derailed by the reluctance 
o f schools, especially ^'ale. to commit the direction o f athletics programs to the influence 
of an mterschool committee dominated by faculty (Smith, 1988: Thelin, 1994). Vale. 
Harvard, and Princeton resisted reform: the establishment guarded its territory jealously 
and av oided integration of academics and athletics (Thelin. 1994). Institutional 
autonomy was the norm among the college athletics establishment.
In spite of the fact that the guidelines which resulted from the Brown Conference 
were ridiculed at the time and that they were not accepted by the majority of colleges, 
many of the regulations still exist in intercollegiate sports. For instance, restrictions on 
practice, definition of and requirement for amateur status, and many of the eligibility 
standards in some form still continue in modem day collegiate sports.
The Growth of Inter-institutional Associations 
The expansion of collegiate athletics was so great after 1880 and the rules 
involving play were so varied that it soon became apparent that inter-institutional 
controlling agencies were needed for their regulation and supervision (Sage. 1990). As 
early as 1883, associations of colleges and univ ersities conducting athletics programs 
w ere being formed in order to create consistent rules and regulations of gov emance 
among them (Guttman. 1978: Hardy &  Berryman. 1982). Indeed, according to Thelm 
( 19 9 4 1, the conference was the crucial collective unit for instilling standards in college 
sports
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Conferences of colleges were formed to standardize athletic procedures among 
schools m one geographic area usually with similar enrollments, academic requirements, 
and financial standings (Sage. 1990). These conferences ordinarily set standards, made 
rules and regulations concerning athletic eligibility, and drew up playing schedules
Smith ( 1988» listed three early attempts at the inter-institutional control o f 
athletics. The first attempt was in 1882. when President Eliot o f Harvard invited the 
faculty of other schools to "prohibit your baseball nine from play ing with professionals 
and secondly to limit the number of matches" (p. 13o ». The second attempt was when 
Harvard in 1883 invited faculty representatives from eight colleges —  Yale, Harvard. 
Princeton. Columbia. Penn. Trinity . Wesleyan, and Williams —  to meet in New York 
City to discuss mutual resolutions to the athletic problem.
Four resolutions were passed by this second group; they were; ( a » no professional 
athlete should be employed as a coach o f any college team: (bi no college team should 
play against a non-college team and games should be contested only on the home 
grounds of one of the colleges: (c) athletes were to be limited to four years of athletic 
participation, and (di each college should set up a faculty athletic committee to approve 
rules and regulations and the colleges which accepted the resolutions would compete 
only against others who did the same (Smith. 1988. p. 1371.
Despite this attempt at controlling college athletics, the members failed to ratify 
these resolutions A concern, primarily held by Yale, was still prevalent about taking 
complete control o f student activities (Hardy &  Berryman. 1982). Consequently, 
individual colleges went back to their own rules regarding eligibility , the participation o f
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professionals, and the hiring of professional coaches ( Sargent, I9IU: Smith. 1988:
\  oung. 18861.
The last o f the three early attempts at the inter-institutional control o f athletics 
came m 1886 when President McCosh o f Princeton proposed that Harv ard again attempt 
to organize the football-playing schools Harv ard said they would organize the meeting 
only i f  Yale attended. Because Yale refused to attend. President McCosh s proposal died 
(Smith. 1988).
By the 1890 s. stronger faculty-run inter-athletic associations became more 
prominent. The Southern Intercollegiate Athletic Conference was founded in 1894 
( Hardy &  Berryman, 1982: Thelin. 1994). The following year, the Intercollegiate 
Conference of Faculty Representatives (The Big-Ten) was formed, introducing faculty 
control o f athletics (Hardy &  Berryman. 1982: Lawrence, 1987. Slaughter. 1989: Thelin. 
1994 ) Its rules outlawed participation in a collegiate sport by persons who had taken 
part in any athletic contest in which money prizes were offered.
On February 18. 1898. faculty, alumni, and student representatives of the 
present-day Iv y League schools, except for Yale, met in a joint attempt to solve 
athletic-related issues ( Hardy &  Berry man, 1982). Over the next few years, associations 
that eventually formed the Big Ten. Ivy League. Northwest Conference. Big Eight. Rocky 
Mountain Faculty Athletic Conference, and PAC Ten were established by the faculties o f 
the existing schools i Fisher. 1916: Hardy &  Berryman. 1982: Needham. 19U5. Powell. 
1964: Savage. 1929: Stagg. 1946: Thelin, 1994). These associations or conferences 
differed from the student groups in that they controlled a number o f spons withm a
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school: they also established guidelines that were ratified b\ all participants for the first 
time.
These organizations are judged to be a significant development in the evolution 
of athletic governance due to their insistence on faculty control and their acceptance o f  
eligibility in terms of educational standards ( Hardy &  Berryman. 1982: Lawrence, 1987: 
Powell. 1964: Stagg, 1946: Thelin, 1994). Nevertheless, as Guttman ( 1978) pointed out. 
the new conferences and associations were not able to solve the problems of govemance 
The central reason was that they had no way of making educational goals supersede the 
goals o f v ictory and prestige for all institutions. Violations o f rules and regulations 
continued.
Between I89u and 1905. different intercollegiate organizations created a variety 
of rules committees, causing a great deal of confusion among teams that often had to 
learn two or more sets o f rules to play the game of football ( Lawrence. 19871. 
Nevertheless, according to Thelin ( 1994), these organizations were the crucial collective 
unit for instilling standards in college sports: these standards included adopting 
restrictions on athletic scholarships, standardizing schedules to limit the numbers of 
games and practices, agreeing on recruiting practices, including faculty representatives 
in conference discussion and govemance. regulating player eligibility. and 
professionalizing athletic administration. Despite these effons. the new conferences and 
associations were not able to solve the problems of govemance. However, by the tum o f 
the century, both detractors and supporters o f intercollegiate sports had adopted the 
posture that proper gov emance and regulation were necessary "to improve, reform, or
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salvage the athletic pastimes which, like a weed, could neither be left alone nor 
completely be eradicated" ( Hardy &  Berry man. 1982. p. 16).
The NC.AA (National Collegiate Athletic .Association)
The lack o f adherence to existing rules and govemance nearly caused the death of 
intercollegiate sports. After a tough and brutal football game w ith Yale in 1905. Harv ard 
dropped the sport o f football because it had ev olv ed into a ruthless contest where players 
were being crippled or even killed (Guttman, 1978, 1982: Hart-Nibbrig. 1989: Lawrence.
1987 ). U S. President Teddy Roosevelt personally intervened to save the game by calling 
a number of college presidents to the White House on October 9. 1905. and pleading 
with them not to drop football.
Responding to the urging of President Roosevelt, a number o f colleges 
representing intercollegiate football met in Philadelphia to discuss the issue of keeping or 
reforming the game, but nothing happened There was strong resistence to giving up 
individual institutional autonomy over college sports in favor o f greater control and the 
collective good ( Fleisher. 1992. Smith. 1988). Following the inaction which resulted 
from this attempt to reform football. Henry M. McCracken, chancellor o f New York 
University, called a special meeting of the football-playing colleges in the nation (Falla. 
1981: Fleisher. 1992: Guttman. 1988: Lapchick. 1989: Lawrence. 1987. Lucas &  Smith. 
1978: Never. 1983: Smith. 1988). The delegates o f thirteen eastem colleges attended the 
meeting in New York City on December 9. 1905 at the Murray Hill Hotel. The group 
eventually decided to reform rather than to eliminate the sport. The group also 
established the organization that ultimately became the present-day gov eming body of
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intercollegiate sports, the National Collegiate Athletic Association —  the NCAA  
( Den linger &  Shapiro. 1975. Falla. 1981. Never. 1983. Sage. 1986. Slaughter, 1989. 
Tow. 1982). Eventually, the NC.AA. under the direction of Captain Palmer Pierce of 
West Point, succeeded in combining its rules-making body with the old committee 
dominated by Walter Camp o f Yale i Falla. 1981: Smith, 1988).
The initial constitution o f the NC.AA stated its chief objective to be "the 
regulation and superv ision o f college athletics throughout the United States, in order that 
the athletic activ ities in the colleges and universities may be maintained on an ethical 
plane in keeping with the dignity and high purposes of education" i lAAUS Proceedings.
1906. p. 29 ). Despite its idealistic purpose, the NCAA was not successful at first in 
attracting the most prestigious institutions to athletic competitions. Harv ard. Yale. 
Pnnceton, and a number o f other major institutions refused to join the association, 
according to Smith (1988) and Thelm ( 1994). These major institutions were hesitant to 
see another group usurp the power which they had traditionally held In addition, the 
concept o f the basic autonomy of each institution w as still very strong in .Amencan 
higher education.
Thelm ( 1994) stated that the reform impulse was slow and weak because the 
young NC.AA was a "ruling body lacking power and prestige" (p. 21). According to 
Smith ( 1988). the real importance of the NC.A.A in its beginning was not that it solved 
problems —  except for creating a uniform set of playing rules for v anous sports —  but 
that It created a forum for discussing them (p. 208)
Originally designed to control the violence o f football, the NCAA ev entually 
expanded its role to govemance of all elements of intercollegiate sports, from the
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standardization o f rules o f play and eligibility o f its athletes lo the functions of 
enforcement and punishment. According to Stem ( 1979). there were a number of 
reasons that the NCA.A grew from a loose confederation into the pnmary governing 
organization for intercollegiate sport. The growing number of institutions committed to 
intercollegiate sports developed the need for standardizing rules, communication, and 
coordination. Also, the NC.A.A-staged championship competitions became more 
important to schools with big-time athletics programs. Later, the rise o f sports on 
telev ision enabled the NCAA to become a strong bargaining force for individual schools. 
Finally , the NCAA gained recognition and legitimacy as the official spokesperson for 
college athletics. In spite of its expanding role, however, the N CA A ’s ability to enforce 
its rules was still very often unsuccessful as a result o f the unwillingness or inability of 
presidents and faculty to control alumni and fans who were in search o f winning teams 
(Slaughter. 1989).
The Camegie Foundation 
In 1929, the NC.A.A solicited the Camegie Foundation for assistance in an attempt 
to provide an independent evaluation o f the status of intercollegiate athletics For 
thirteen years, the foundation investigated schools and programs ( Andre &  .lames. 1991: 
Durso. 1975: Lawrence. 1987: Lucas &  Smith. 1978. Mallette &  Howard. 1992:
Slaughter. 1989). The results of this investigation, Howard Savage's Amencan College 
■Athletics, show ed the extent to which schools were ignoring the rules o f the NC.A.A. 
Documenting professionalism, commercialism, and exploitation as well as violations in 
the recruitinu and subsidizinu o f athletes, the Camesiie Foundation considered the illeual
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Denhnger &  Shapiro. 1975: Guttman. 1982. 1988: Lucas &  Smith. 19781 In addition, 
the study took presidents to task for their failure to defend the integrity of higher 
education i kjeldsen, 1982: Knight Foundation, 1993).
Macaroon ( 1991 ) felt that the Camegie report o f 1929 did not shnnk from 
directly questioning the intellectual quality and sincerity of .Amencan higher education 
Itself It has also been noted that the report showed several cases where intercollegiate 
sport was not under faculty control but was unduly influenced by overzealous alumni and 
coaches ( Falla. 1981. p. 129 ). Hardy and Berryman ( 1982 ) pointed out that the report 
suggested that any foreign visitor to an Amencan campus during football season would 
immediately ask what relation such an "astonishing athletic display had to the work o f 
an intellectual agency like a university " (p. 16).
Slaughter ( 1989 ) considered the pnmary purpose of the Camegie Report to be to 
provide a challenge to college presidents to take control of their athletic programs and to 
ov ercome the cumulative effects o f years of benign neglect and blind obeisance to the 
desires of students, alumni, trustees, and the public. It concluded that. "Apparently, the 
ethical gearing of intercollegiate football contests and their scholastic aspects are of 
secondary importance to the winning of victories and financial success” ( p 8).
This period was marked by an acknow ledgment on the part of the NC.AA of 
problems in intercollegiate sports. Unfonunately, it also denoted a lack of eflbrt on the 
part of the NCAA to prov ide solutions to these problems (Slaughter, 1989: Thelin. 1994). 
The association admitted the problem, but shied away from attempting solutions. Part of 
the problem was that the enforcement program of the NCAA consisted only o f
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self-discipline among institutions rather than of any actual enforcement activities by the 
NCAA ( Slaughter. 1989 )
The Rules Enforcement Decision o f the NC.AA
In 1941. the NC.A.A finally realized that it was not accomplishing what it had set 
out to do —  control intercollegiate athletics Therefore, a new constitution was created, 
calling for the expulsion of members who refused to follow the association rules and 
guidelines. In 1948. the association adopted a “sanity code" that limited the awarding of 
scholarships based on athletic ability: within a year, it had targeted seven institutions for 
awarding scholarships to athletes based on athletic ability: twenty more were estimated 
to have broken the rule (Fleisher. 1992: Lawrence, 1987: Slaughter. 1989. Stem. 1979: 
Thelin, 1994). Even though the motion to suspend the seven institutions failed in a vote 
of the membership, the ability to levy other sanctions was established within the NCA.A 
as a result ( Byers. 1995; Fleisher. 1992: Robert &  Olson. 1989; Stem. 1979: Thelin.
1994 ). Eventually the code establishing need as a cnterion for scholarship was repealed 
so that scholarships could be awarded based on athletic ability : nevertheless, the 
enforcement policy of the NCAA had begun (Byers, 1995: Slaughter. 1989).
In 1952. the "enforcement decision" was reached (Falla. 1981: Tow. 1982)
This very important decision gave the NC.AA formal control over rule making and the 
authority to impose sanctions upon violators of recruiting, eligibility , and other rules 
(Chu. 1982: Denlinger & Shapiro. 1975: Lawrence, 1987: Sperber. 1990: Stem. 1979). 
Since the NC.A A Enforcement Office started keeping records on October 16. 1952. it has 
documented 442 violations of the NC.A.A Rule Book. In 96 o f these cases, institutions
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were cited specifically tor lack of institutional control Since 1980. 55 cases o f NCA.A 
violation based on lack of institutional control involving 47 Div ision I athletic 
institutions have come to light ( NCA.A Enforcement Summarv. 1995 ).
The College Football Association Challenge to the NC.A.A
In 1981, Stev e Horn, president o f Long Beach State, as well as other presidents, 
lobbied for the sharing o f rev enue between all Division 1 institutions ( Byers, 19951. It 
was felt that distributing revenues more broadly would reduce incentives to cheat. As 
things stood then, schools sometimes would earn millions of dollars from the handful of 
athletes who made the team a winner. Incentives to recruit and keep those 
money-makers
was so high that rule breaking and exploitation were almost inevitable ( Andre and James, 
1991).
The issue o f rev enue shanng scared the major football institutions into creating 
the College Football Association ( Byers, 1995 ). The organization was formed on 
February 2 . I98U, as a special interest group within the NC.A.A. it was made up o f 61 
institutions with large-scale football programs (Byers. 1995; Thelin. 1994) With Chuck 
Nanas as its executive director, it became a lobbying group creating rumors of the 
possibility of seceding if  rev enue sharing became a reality .
Until the practice was declared in v iolation of antitrust laws, the NC.AA required 
that all schools abide by its television rules; this precluded any school from selling the 
telev ision rights to its own Saturday afternoon games ( Noll, 19911. In 1981. two major 
powers of the CFA. Georgia and Oklahoma, filed suit against the NCAA claiming pnce
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fixing, output restraints, and monopolizing under the Sherman Antitrust Act ( Funk,
1991) Oklahoma and Georgia sued the NC.AA in order to gain the nght of 
self-determination m the televising o f their ovvtt football games (Thelin &  Wiseman.
1989).
In September of 1982. Judge Juan Burciaga in New Mexico ruled that the NC.AA 
was a cartel and a monopoly and that its telev ison control constituted an unlawful 
constraint o f trade in v iolation o f Section I of the Sherman Antitrust Act and an unlawful 
monopolization of the pertinent market, violating Section 2 ( Thelin, 1989). The 
Supreme Court upheld the decision on June 27, 1984 ( Byers. 1995. Fleisher. 1992: 
Guttman, 1988: Hart-Nibbrig. 1989: Sperber, 1990: Thelin, 1989). The NC.AA could no 
longer act as the sole distributer o f college football games to national telev ision 
networks In effect, this decision made each college or university a seller in a new ly 
deregulated sports television market and instigated a helter-skelter scramble to gain 
access to the largest pnme-time sports audiences (Hart-Nibbrig, 1989).
The Difficulty o f Institutional Control
Frey 1 1985 ) has suggested three reasons for the problems of institutional control 
of athletics. First, the nature o f American colleges and univ ersities has been that of a 
public serv ice entity. Universities have pushed athletic departments into external 
partnerships w hen institutional budgets for athletics were not increased, w hile athletics 
costs hav e doubled in as little as ten years. Athletic departments hav e had to seek 
revenue from external groups, who. in tum. desire control i.Atwell. 1980).
Because there was no reliable source of support, such as the State, the financing
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of higher education was often precanous. University presidents have found themselves 
directing their energies more to fund raising than to educational development They have 
had to adopt an entrepreneurial spirit relating more to the business and gov ernment 
communities than to the academic The nature of the modem university requires that the 
president w ork at the boundary o f the institution focusing on obtaining resources from 
the extemal env ironment ( Frey, 1994).
Colleges and universities have also been put into competition with each other for 
resources ( Frey, 1985 ). The most popular solution athletics departments have used to 
close the gap between flat revenues o f ticket sales and rising expenses is the soliciting o f 
donations. Because of this, presidents and athletics departments hav e relied on 
communities for financial support.
.According to Pfeffer and Salanak 1 1978 ». once an organization subunit is defined 
as v ulnerable or in critical need o f resources, demands and dependencies expand. 
Organizations are not self-sufficient; they are subject to uncertainties and may be 
vulnerable to exploitation or extemal control by the outsiders who control resources the 
organization needs. The controlling coalitions may have goals that are inconsistent with 
those of the larger organization. I f  the larger organization cannot develop an altemative 
base of resources, then it w ill not be able to counter the pow er of the external 
constituencies over the subunit ( Frey. 19941
Athletics also broadened the appeal of the institution to the community (Chu.
1982) and assisted in fund-raising and student recruitment (Frey. 19851. The result of this 
was that govemance responded more to extemal constituencies of the local community 
than to intemal preferences of the institution or of a national gov eming body such as the
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NCAA ( Frey. 1985: Simon. 1985 ». As a consequence, it was difficult to control athletic 
departments because these units have very powerful network constituents in the 
community ( Frey. 1994 ) Flovvev er. these linkages were not just the result o f university 
efforts: the community saw the value o f athletics and cultivated profitable linkages.
Riley and Baldndge ( 1977) also felt that it was difficult to control departments 
because the community has very powertul network constituents. They went on to say 
that it was natural that community business and political elites would be attracted to 
athletics, sports prov ided a v icanous reinforcement o f their ideals More important, 
however, was the view that a successful college athletics program could reflect positively 
on the community or region. The area could obtain national recognition or v isibility 
should the college team be successful. In addition, any time a sporting event was 
conducted, the business community reaped benefits.
The athletics department's ability to forge strong links to extemal constituencies 
has promoted stronger independence compared to other institution subunits i Frey. 1985: 
Riley and Baldridge. 1977: Sperber, 1990). These strong links to extemal constituencies 
have lumed into w hat Frey ( 1982. 1986) called a booster coalition made up of booster 
clubs, non-profit foundations, and independent athletic departments. The coalition is 
composed o f alumni and community representatives who exchange resources in the form 
of money, materials, and political influence for the right to associate with coaches and 
athletes, for the status or prestige this association brings, and for the access to other 
persons like themselves who may possess political and economic resources that coalition 
members need or want ( Frey. 1994 ).
Frey ( 1985 ) pointed out that as any department on campus retains autonomy.
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athletics ha\e acquired independence, but the latter's autonomy exceeds what is possible 
for the other subunits. This is Iargel> due to the abiiit> oCathletic departments to build 
connections with significant external constituencies to an extent beyond what other 
university subunits have been able to do. The established distribution o f power by means 
of this alliance is an accepted way of doing business: it has cultural support: and it has 
some legitimation within the larger organizational context because univ ersm 
administrations prefer to rely on this alliance rather than make the changes necessarv to 
redirect their resource-acquisition strategies ( Frey. 1994)
Frev ( 1982 > has asserted that presidents, facultv, and students will always lose the 
control battle because they do not have the resources to compete with those av ailable to 
the booster coalition. Thelin ( 1989) has also pointed out that a partnership o f powerful 
external boosters and the athletics department is a formidable opponent for a president 
This partnership makes entrepreneurial athletics directors especially strong: at some 
universities, the athletics directors may have a bener chance than the president to prevail 
in a major confrontation (Davis, 1979: Miller. 1982).
Finally. Frey and other authors have pointed out that it is the nature o f the 
universitv to be composed of loosely related segments and to have many goals, numerous 
and vaned constituencies, and fragmented decision-making (Aldnch, 1979: Frey. 1985. 
1986. 1994: Riley &  Baldridge, 1977). The American college or universitv. as Cohen 
I 1974) has stated, is a prototv pe of organized anarchy Its goals are either vague or in 
dispute: its technologv is familiar but not understood: its major participants wander in 
and out o f the organization. These factors do not necessarily make it a bad organization 
or a disorganized one, said Cohen, but thev do make it a problem to describe, understand.
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and lead. It can also create a situation where weakly-connected departments act 
independently of each other and of the institution ( Riley and Baldridge. 19771.
Frey ( 19941. Lapchick ( 1987). and Thelin ( 1989) have maintained that a number 
o f the problems m college athletics can be traced to the fact that many programs have 
operated separately from their institutions, w ith little or no accountability to the president 
or chancellor. Riley and Baldridge ( 1977) have said that decision making is often shared 
and participatory and appears disorderly at times, but it reflects the autonomy of 
departments and professionals. It is a system with little central coordination and is 
almost an organized anarchy in which each individual in the university is seen making 
autonomous decisions. The decision making reflects the variety o f goals, the multiplicity 
of specialized interests o f faculty and departments, and the autonomy of athletics
Davies ( 1979) and Thelin ( 1989) have contended that although the confusion 
disturbs the president, it also serv es him. An ambiguity of power, as Cohen and March 
( 1974) point out. leads to a parallel ambiguity of responsibility. Nowhere is this 
ambiguity more striking for presidential authority than in intercollegiate athletics. If  no 
one IS in charge, no one is to blame Presidents, as well as athletics directors, may hide 
behind the NC.AA umbrella when things turn bad (Thelin, 1989).
Combining w ith the service orientation and the loosely coupled nature of the 
higher education institution is the independent nature of athletics and the long tradition 
of local autonomy Stem ( 1979) contended that the local autonomy of the institution was 
affected by three factors related to the NC.AA. First was the fact that the original 38 
schools insisted that their own programs be controlled by their own f:hool faculty. 
Second, the NCAA 1906 constitution established local autonomv and facultv control of
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programs as fundamental pnnciples. In addition, the NCAA 19u9 constitution permitted 
schools to rile written objections to any legislation enacted by the delegates: such a tiling 
made the legislation non-binding on the institution. Third, the nght of self-governance 
for constitution members was continually referred to in the rhetonc of association 
meetings, particularly when the issue of enforcement o f NCAA rules of eligibility and 
conduct was debated. Thelin ( 1994). too. has pointed out that higher education has 
traditionally been a markedly decentralized arrangement characterized by institutional 
autonomy, voluntary association, and relatively little government regulation. This 
principle o f local autonomy established a pattern o f loose coupling within the NCAA  
(Flath, 1964: Stem. 1979),
In an effective organization, as Lawrence and Lorsch ( 1967) hav e stated, each 
subunit develops characteristics that enable it to deal w ith a particular sector of the 
env ironment However, at the same time, these subunits must be integrated for the 
purpose of control —  the essence of organizational control is the restnction o f subunit 
autonomy (Frey. 1904)
Restricting the autonomy o f the athletics department has been difficult. "Doing 
something" about athletics carries great personal nsk for a president ( Frey 1982: Thelin 
1989 ). It’s nsky business as Hanford ( 19761 has said, and academic lore is full of 
unpleasant stories about university presidents who have been forced out by athletic 
imbroglios. Paul Hardin of SMU, for example, was fired in 1974 after he exposed 
significant v iolations of NC.A.A rules on his own campus (.Andre & James. 1991: 
Oberlander. 1988c: Thelin. 1989). In 1988, first-vear Indiana Universitv President
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Thomas Ehrlich committed a cardinal Hoosier sin when he openly criticized popular, 
successful basketball coach Bobby knight (Thelin. 19891.
Unfonunately. for presidents, intercollegiate athletics often is a no-win 
proposition. No matter what happens, someone is visibly and vocally upset: this can lead 
to the sy ndrome o f presidential inattention’ ( Hanford 1976: Thelin. 1989). .According to 
Thelin. a president may legitimately wonder if  it is prudent to nsk one's office on 
something as educationally peripheral as athletics: even the most courageous college 
presidents may feel that accepting the local status quo is the best strategy
There are still other problems noted in the literature concerning the institutional 
control of athletics. Smith ( 1989) pointed out the fact that while chief executive officers 
head individual institutions, the control o f athletics necessitates inter-institutional 
agreements. .A truism in college sports is that one president or institution which makes a 
dramatic move will do so alone (Thelin. 1989 ): not even a courageous president dares to 
embrace the notion of "unilateral disarmament." The harsh news, as Thelin has pointed 
out. IS that abuses in intercollegiate athletics will be solved only when presidents and 
institutions act together.
Another difficulty lies in the fact that college presidents are hired and fired by 
governing boards: therefore, it is rare for a president to take a stance on athletics that 
differs from that of the board ( Smith. 1989). Indeed. Thelin ( 1989) believ es that. "The 
more intense, the more v isible. and the more costly the athletic program, the less 
influence the CEO has over it ( p 75 ).
It IS clear that, from the beginning of intercollegiate sport, presidential 
involvement and leadership have never been consistent. Vet. leading a university is a
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
41
much more complex and demanding task today than it was thirty or fom years ago 
(Slaughter. 1989) This opens the way for highly paid athletic directors, large athletic 
department staffs, booster clubs, and even independent corporations with their own 
boards of directors to run all or a portion o f the athletic program (Slaughter. 1989. p.
186).
Walter Schenkel ( 1971 ) considers "governance of the contemporary university to 
be a complex system o f checks and balances in which it is virtually impossible for a 
single person to dominate the governance process" ( p 12). The NCAA has, however, 
assigned responsibility for control of athletics specifically to the university president. 
Caught between the demands of the NCAA and the pressures to creating winning 
programs, chief executive officers can find their job o f controlling athletics very 
complicated
Commercialism and Winning at All Cost
Presidents have learned of their communities’ lust for winning: most believe that 
a winning program attracts students, financial contributions, and favorable legislative 
appropnations ( Frey. 1986 ). According to Guttman ( 1982 ). the lust for winning extends 
to alumni and state legislators; "It is common knowledge that alumni and state legislators 
are invariably more generous to their alma mater or state university when the football 
team has done well" ( p 731.
Most CEU's choose not to be in the direct finng line should athletic problems 
erupt ( Miller. 1982 ). So who is in the direct firing line ’ Some might say it’s the athletics 
director. Accordinu to Miller, however, it is the head coach who faces the greatest
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pressures to win. As early as the late 1800's, coaches had to win to keep their jobs 
(Camp. 1894: Lucas &  Smith. 1978). Bringing in the professional coach m the latter 
1800's did not change the emphasis on winning: instead it intensified it. The emphasis 
on winning continued on into the 1900 s. Hardy and Berryman ( 19821 quoted Amherst's 
president. Alexander Meiklejohn. as saying in 1922 that \  ictones indicated better than 
anything else the quality of the undergraduate life " ( p. 24).
Enormous financial rewards for winning expanded dunng the l96U's and 
multiplied in the I970's and I980's. NCAA enforcement never kept pace and the 
effectiveness of conference commissioners as regulators and enforcers became virtually 
non-existent ( Byers. 1995 ). Indeed, according to Andre and James ( 1991 ). winning is so 
lucrative that schools face great pressure to circumvent or violate whatever standards 
exist
By 1980. according to Lapchick ( 1996). the number one. and perhaps only, rule 
that mattered was winning: n sold tickets and increased chances for TV  coverage.
Coaches who followed this rule kept their jobs: no one pointed a finger at the coaches 
unless they lost. Richard Dav ies ( 1995 ) has declared that. " If  you lose your games, 
you're certain to be fired. I f  you break the rules, you have to be caught to be fired" ( p 
27 ). As Rooney ( 1980 ) observed, a little cheating buys time in what can be described as. 
at best, an insecure profession ( 1980). It can hardly be surpnsing that when confronted 
by the stark contrast between success and failure, many, if  not most, coaches are tempted 
to do whatever needs to be done to win.
In addition, successful head coaches today are rewarded with salaries in the 
hundreds of thousands o f dollars, with fast food franchises, stocks, bonds, homes.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
43
automobiles, country club memberships, income-producing telev ision and radio shows, 
highly lucrative product endorsements, lecture and sports clinic opportunities, and other 
special amenities i Edwards. 1986 > Over time, as the rewards for winning have 
multiplied, so have cheating and the breaking of rules t Byers. 19951 As Funk ( 1991 ) 
said, "Coaches are under intense pressure from administrators and alumni to produce 
V ictones. These pressures, combined with the tremendous monetary and material 
rewards available to successful Division I coaches, motiv ate some in the business to use 
any means necessary to secure the skilled athlete" (p. 89».
The I980’s was a period when many of the unfortunate effects of the pressures 
surfaced. Irregularities and illegalities at universities as div erse as Mary land. Georgia. 
Minnesota. SMU, Tulane. and USC were widely publicized (Wheeler. 1996, p. 1321. 
.According to Simon ( 1991 ». a particularly sad account of abuse of the rules, which 
unfortunately may not be aty pical, is prov ided by former Clemson University basketball 
coach Tates Locke. As Locke described the situation at Clemson. said Simon. "There 
was a tremendous pressure on him to win. WTiile he did not let himself know about 
many of the recruiting violations involving under-the-table payments to players which 
were perpetrated by alumni and boosters, he may have condoned deceptions designed to 
lure recRiits to Clemson" (Simon, p. 127».
One o f the few attempts to correct the attitude that coaches need to win was 
offered by Leonard koppett according to Sperber ( 1990 ). koppet's feeling was that 
coaches should have the same status as professors and be hired according to the same 
standards o f integnty and at comparable salaries. This, he said, would free them of he 
win-at-all-costs demands.
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A recurrent cnticism of college sports and a contributing cause o f the win-at-all- 
costs attitude is that college sports have become a big business characterized by 
commercialism and professional (Frey. 1982: Koch. 1971: Rooney. 1985: Scott 1956: 
Thelin. 19891. Lucas and Smith ( 1978) explained that the commercial aspects o f 
intercollegiate athletics began early as a means o f surv iv al when students had to raise 
money to support and finance college athletics. " If  administrators in the beginning had 
controlled athletics and financed them through proper channels, then students may not 
have commercialized them for reason of surv iv al " ( p. 2251 Also, as Riley and 
Baldridge ( 1977) and Raibom ( 1982 ) have pointed out. universities have pushed their 
athletic departments into external partnerships by not increasing their athletic budgets 
while athletic costs have increased significantly. Athletic departments have had to seek 
revenue from external groups, who. in turn, desire control (Atwell. I98(J). The results 
have made it difficult to control athletic departments because they have v ery developed 
powerful network constituents.
In the early |900’s the commercial and professional aspects o f athletics began to 
intensify Players wanted to win because of institutional and individual prestige: alumni 
wanted to win for it was the most visible symbol o f a virile institution: college 
presidents felt that success in football meant greater institutional as well as personal 
recognition, for the coach —  his job depended on it (Lucas &  Smith. 1978).
The desire for popular support led college presidents to adv ertise their institutions 
m any way they could No other advertising medium had a greater hold upon the 
populace than did athletics (Lucas &  Smith, 1978 ). The use of athletics as an 
advertising tool was started in the 187U's and was a national phenomenon by 1900
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University o f Chicago's president Harper attempted to promote his institution with 
winning teams by hiring Amos Alonzo Stagg. According to Lucas and Smith, he told 
Stagg to develop teams which "we can send around the country and knock out all the 
colleges. We will give them a palace, a car. and a vacation, too” (p. 219). President 
McCosh of Princeton recruited students by mentioning \ ictones ov er Harv ard and Yale 
C.AL sent its track team on a tour of the east in 1895 to pursue their goals in part by 
taking advantage of the publicity successful athletic programs could generate ( Femer. 
1930: Schmidt 1957). VATien Indiana first won the state football championship, they 
reportedly felt that every thing that was connected with their university became suddenly 
interesting to the people o f the state (Lucas &  Smith. 1978: Woodbum. 1940). President 
Slocum of Colorado College felt his institution would never gain the recognition that u 
deserv ed until it had a winning football team i Lewis. 19o4 )
Not all college presidents favored advertising their institutions through athletics 
though they generally did not speak out loudly for fear o f losing enrollment, public 
support, or alumni backing (Lucas &  Smith, 1978). For example. President Charles Eliot 
o f Harv ard spoke out against the promotion of athletics. .Although he onginally rowed 
for Harvard crew, he later became disillusioned with athletics. He denied that athletic 
wins and losses affected prestige and enrollment.
-Although commercialized collegiate athletics was a growing industry before 
midcentury, financial domination of big-time collegiate football and basketball is a post 
World War II phenomenon. The factors identified by Sage ( I99U) that contributed to 
this were the growth of mass media and telev ision rev enues, the development o f rapid 
and convenient air transportation making possible interregional rivalries, an increase in
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leisure time and discretionary income, and the advent of Sports Information Directors 
and their w idely successful ad\ ertismg efforts ip 1741.
Athletics has alway s been a business to a certain extent, but according to Funk 
( 1991 ) today's athletic endeavors have definitely become a big business, the profit 
motive has increased the necessity and importance of winning, and the wmning-is- 
everyihing attitude has opened the door to the moral decay afflicting college athletics ( p. 
93 ). The effect on colleges has been to sharpen the financial importance o f w inning to a 
team and league. The obvious result is to increase the incentiv es to v iolate NCAA rules 
in order to recruit the kinds of athletes who improve the athletic program (Noll. 1990).
Simon ( 1991 ) also has agreed with the contention that sports has become big 
business. Television revenues and the visibility and support which come with winning 
basketball and football teams seem to many to undermine the educational ideal of sports, 
according to Simon and to Wheeler (1996). Byers {1995) maintained that telev ision is 
commercializing all of Amenca's values. The need to compete with professional teams 
for the entertainment dollar became, ex post facto, a legitimate economic argument of 
the football coaches (p. 136)
.According to Hart-Nibbng ( 1991 ). universities and the NCAA have tailed by and 
large to contain the commercial aspects o f sports. A part of the problem is that schools 
have perpetuated an vicious cycle o f the need to win. In intercollegiate athletics, huge 
coaching and recruiting staffs are necessary to compete with other schools Winning 
teams are necessary to justify the staffs. The staffs are necessary to produce the wins.
The wins are necessary to sell the tickets and rate TV exposure. The income is necessary 
to justify the expense of producing the wins. Some authors hav e felt that the sharing of
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television and bowl revenues within a conference would make winning less important 
and so lesson the schools' incentive to cheat (Andre &  James. I99|: Byers. 1995 ». Either 
way. one person who can make a difference in solving the problem is the college 
president.
Presidential Efforts to Control Athletics 
Mallette and Howard ( 1992) wrote that "the college presidency is a complex job 
with multiple responsibilities, many competing values and prionties. and an abundance 
o f distractions. But w hether the campus is large or small. Division 1 or 111, 'big time' or 
small time.' the president still is accountable for ensuring the integrity of the 
intercollegiate athletics program" (p. 31). Observers agree, according to Thelin ( 1994), 
that the key figure in reform is the college or university president. However, making 
decisive changes in athletics policy is not easy for a president who must contend with 
external pressures, problems o f a single campus working in isolation, and the visibility of 
college sports. Presidents who take a stand as national leaders and spokesman on 
containing the costs and abuses o f college sports show a high burnout rate ( Thelin. 1989 ». 
From the early days, they have encountered difficulties from a number of different 
sources For example, presidents, hired and fired by boards of trustees, have usually not 
taken stands in opposition to those who pay their salaries. As boards of trustees were 
supportive of intercollegiate athletics in the latter 1800's, it was natural for presidents not 
to create controversies by calling for drastic actions when intercollegiate athletics crises 
occurred ( Smith. 1988).
However, univ ersity presidents, not governing boards, have usually been singled
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OUI for having the opportunity to reform athletics They have also been criticized for 
seldom doing so Presidents, who throughout the nineteenth century had a great deal o f 
power in controlling the destinies of higher education, rarely took initiatives in reforming 
athletics ( Smith. 1988). \  et some chief executive officers have spoken out against the 
excesses of intercollegiate athletics and some hav e taken strong action. President 
.Andrew White of Cornell said in 1883 that. "I will not permit 30 men to travel 400 
miles merely to agitate a bag o f wind" ( Isaacs. 1978. p. 169 ). President Eliot o f Harv ard 
condemned football with its increasing v iolence saying. "The game of football grows 
worse and worse as regards foul and violent play, and the number and grav ity o f injuries 
which the players suffer. It has become perfectly clear that the game as now play ed is 
unfit for college use" ( Report of the President o f Harvard College. 1893-1894. p. 16). 
Benjamin Ide Wheeler o f Cal and David Starr Jordon of Stanford led early efforts to 
declare freshman ineligible for track and football during the 1910-1915 era (Schultz. 
1989). President Woodrow Wilson of Pnnceton commented that higher education was 
forced to worry that the "sideshows" had started to swallow up the "circus." leav ing the 
performers in the "main tent" to "whistle for their audiences, discouraged and 
humiliated" i Hardy &  Berryman. 1982 p. 21 ). Harold Stoke, former president o f New 
Hampshire and LSU stated that the duties of higher education have been transformed into 
a responsibility of the educational system to supply the public with entertainment 
(Nov err. 1983)
President James B. Angel I of the University of Michigan talked his fellow Big 
Ten presidents into adopting rules to keep football within reasonable bounds. On March 
9th. 19(16. thev limited the season to five names, restricted eliuibilitv to three vears with
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graduate students banned, students must hav e a year o f residence before competing in 
athletics, they must have proper grades, training tables were abolished and capped 
student ticket pnces at 50 cents. The coach had to be a full time faculty member. On top 
o f this the Big Ten insisted on absolute facultv control. Unfortunately, president 
AngelTs own football coach went to his board o f regents and the board pulled Michigan 
out of the big ten. Michigan did not rejoin until 1917 (Byers, 1995: Nelson. 1982.
Wilson &  Brondfield, 1967).
In 1931, Dr James Angel I o f Yale stated. "I believe that any system which by its 
very nature encourages proselytizing among boy athletes in the secondary schools is 
pernicious. I do not believ e there is any obligation on the part o f the college to furnish 
the general public nor even the alumni with substitutes for the circus, the prize fight, and 
the gladiatonal combat" ( Nov err. 1983. p. 114). At about the same time. Dr Charles 
Kennedy of Pnnceton declared. ”1 earnestly hope that the colleges of our country will 
deflate intercollegiate football and restore it to its natural place in the life of the 
undergraduates" ( Nov err. 1983. p 114).
.Also in the I930's. Abraham Flexner. a veteran o f the Carnegie Foundation 
studies, cnticized the commercialism of the Univ ersity o f Chicago football program 
(Thelin. 19941. Apparently. .President Robert Hutchins o f the University of Chicago 
agreed. He became one of the first presidents to eliminate a major collegiate sport by 
dropping his school's football program (Nelson. 1982: Rooney. 1980). In dropping out of 
the Big Ten Conference in 1946, Hutchins stated that, "Education is primarily 
concerned with the training of the mind, and athletics and social life, though they may 
contribute to it. are not the heart o f it and cannot be permitted to interfere with it "
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(Byers. 1995. p. 4 !)  Everett Case ot'Colgate speaking in 1947 asked, "Where is the 
glory in a Colgate \ ictory won by men not picked and developed from the regular student 
body but offered special financial inducements to 'represent' you? What would you think 
o f your college if  we used funds entrusted to us for educational purposes to go out and 
hire a football team ’" ( Rooney . 1980. p. 21 )
In 1982, Father Lo Schiavo. the president of the Univ ersity o f San Francisco, after 
renegade boosters were responsible for causing back-to-back probations, decided to 
eliminate the basketball program. In dropping basketball. Father Lo Schiavo commented 
that the university could no longer control its powerful booster organization: he said. 
"There was no way to measure the damage done to the university’s most priceless assets, 
its integrity and reputation" (Chronicle of Higher Education. 1983, p. 26 ). Lo Schiavo 
reportedly also declared that there are those who "are determined to break the rules 
presumably because they are convinced that the university cannot stay within the rules 
and maintain an effective competition program" ( Simon. 1991. p. 4 3 1.
Father Lo Schiavo met with cnticism from his school's booster club. A member 
of the Don Century Club stated that "Lo Schiavo aspires to mediocnty and could never 
form a selection committee that would bang us the type of coach we need. I hope for the 
good of the university. Father Lo Schivo goes" (Boston Globe. 1983. p. 29: Simon. 1991. 
p. 65 ), However. Father Lo Schiavo prev ailed and amateur norms are being restored at 
the University of San Francisco. Basketball players are recruited locally, the mission in 
this case is to demonstrate that a basketball program can stay clean and still win. Alumni 
help raise funds, but are no longer involved in recruiting (Hart-Nibbng. 1991 ).
Eamon Kelly o f Tulane University suspended it's basketball program after a point
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shaving scandal was uncovered: the key player at Tulane admitted having received 
S10.UOO from an assistant coach on signing to attend the univ ersity in 19 8 1 ( Lapchick. 
1986)
On the other hand, there have also been presidents who have commented 
favorably on intercollegiate athletics. President Ethelburt D. Garfield o f Miami o f Ohio 
all but required his faculty to join the football team and became the only president to 
ever incur an injury while competing for his college team (Rudolph. 1962: Schultz.
1989). President William Rainey Harper of the University o f Chicago hired former Yale 
All-American Amos Alonzo Stagg to coach his team to develop teams which we can 
send around the country and knock out all the colleges We will giv e them a palace car 
and a vacation too" (Lucas &  Smith. 1978, p. 219).
John R. Hubbard of USC called college sports the glue that holds the university 
together ( kirshenbaum. 1980: Nelson. 1982). John Hannah, president o f Michigan State 
in 1941. promoted athletics by saying. "I believe that somehow athletics are tied up with 
that fiercely burning spint o f competition which has been the trademark o f Amenca 
since the day it was discovered" ( Byers. 1995. p. 42 ). Unfortunately , Hannah s big time 
athletics also, in the view of Walter Byers ( 1995), fueled a new era of cheating, which 
soon brought the colleges to a crisis comparable to the one that drove Teddy Roosevelt to 
act.
Governing Boards
Governing boards, many o f which were made up of alumni, became a natural 
method of controlling athletics. Even thouuh Smith ( 1989) considered uoveminu boards
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a real power behind big-time athletics, he suggested that they hav e also been a source of 
athletic abuse. Governing boards in the late nineteenth century, like presidents, spoke for 
America when they endorsed football and other sports on the college campus. Boards 
more and more were drawn from the business elite to set policy in American colleges and 
universities. They soon began to set athletic policy as well. Smith ( 1988) wrote that 
gov erning boards, condoning the business aspects o f athletics, increasingly agreed to the 
hiring o f professional coaches and the erection o f large stadiums which could seat far 
more that the number o f student and staff. "The brutal nature o f mass plays in football 
probably mirrored the businessmen's world, as did the commercial aspect o f football" 
(Smith, p. 98).
One telling example o f abuse of athletic governance power occurred in Texas 
While the head of the board o f governors, the newly-elected governor o f Texas. Bill 
Clements, was involved in paying a football player to attend Southern Methodist 
University (Andre &  James. 1991: Trager. 1990). Neither was SMU's nearby neighbor. 
TCU. immune to the negative results o f the governing board behavior It was found that 
a payment-to-players scheme was coordinated by a member of the TCU Board o f 
Trustees ( Lapchick. 1986: Rooney , 1980). This exemplifies how the mixed interest o f 
controlling athletics while still promoting winning programs is worsened by the fact that 
governing boards generally do not have contact with the NC.AA. main enforcement 
organization of college sports (Smith. 1989).
Thelin pointed out that the University of Miami President. Edward T Foote, was 
caught in a bind with his governing board. When Miami came under fire for athletics 
abuses, at least one influential member of the univ ersitv's uoverninu board said that
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nothing would interfere with the Hurricanes's dnve to be nationally competitive in 
football (Sullivan. 1987. Thelin. 19891.
Since it is the president of a college, not its governing board, who sends a 
representative to the NCAA, it is the duty o f the president, not the governing board, to 
control athletics. The president is caught between these responsibilities, the demands of 
faculty , and the demands o f the governing board. But presidents are hired and fired by 
boards, and it has been a rare president who has taken a stance on athletics which differs 
from the board's (Smith. 1989). One who did was the president of Clemson. William Lee 
Atchley, who resigned when he realized that he could not control his athletics department 
( Lapchick, 1986i. There was a power struggle between him and Bill McLellan. the 
athletics director and the trustees would not give Atchley a vote of confidence ( Lapchick. 
1986). Similarly , when President John A. DiBaggio of Michigan State tried to prev ent 
his football coach from becoming the athletics director, he was overruled by the trustees 
(Byers. 1995).
The Knight Foundation report has suggested that it is time for governing boards to 
support their presidents. A number o f writers have asserted that with the support of the 
governing board, a conscientious president may make a difference in the institutional 
control of athletics (Mallette.& Howard. 1992: Schultz. 1989; Thelin. 1989)
The Faculty Athletics Representative
At the 19 9 1 annual conference of the American Association o f University 
Professors. Creed Black, chair of the Knight Foundation Commission on the Future of 
College Sports said. "O f all the people testify ing before the Knight Commission, the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
54
most disappointing, the least impressive, were the facultv athletic representatives. They 
seemed to have no idea what their role was. Their role is obviously to represent 
academic interests, but they seemed to have been co-opted by the athletic departments"
< Thelin. 1994. p. 150 ).
At most institutions, faculty athletics representative are responsible for 
relationships with the NCAA and with the conference o f which the institution is a 
member. They are also responsible for intra-institutionai relationships among the 
faculty , administration, and department of athletics. Finally , they should have a concern 
for the academic and athletic performance and well-being o f the institutions student 
athletes (Mallette &  Howard 1992).
In many instances, the faculty athletic representative is the key person within 
conferences. The most distinctive characteristic o f the Pacific Coast Conference, 
according to Thelin ( 1994), was that its power was vested in its faculty athletic 
representatives. The faculty athletic representative was usually appointed by the 
president, often upon recommendation from the campus faculty senate Despite alleged 
autonomy , the representative was still subject to pressure from the athletics director, the 
coaches, and the president. Thelin contends that, in sum. it was unreasonable to expect 
the faculty athletic representative either to represent faculty or to be influential in the 
NCAA forum.
Conference Efforts in Governance 
On the conference level, the one major effort made to control athletics came in 
1951 when the Ivy League Conference de-emphasized athletics by dropping scholarships
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based on athletic ability (Byers. 1995: Guttman. 1988. 1991 ». At present, they offer only 
needs-based and academic scholarships. According to Simon 1 1985 ». many would argue 
that the only reputable intercollegiate athletic programs are those which resemble the 
Division III or Ivy League lev els, where scholarships are given only for need, athletes are 
treated as students, and competition is regional rather than national in scope.
Unfortunately, there have been examples where conferences have not been 
effective in controlling athletics. Byers ( 1995 ) points out the plight of the conference 
commissioner as having the rather unenviable position o f sitting as judge of those who 
employ him. Vic Schmidt, the commissioner o f the Pac Ten, after punishing UCL.A and 
USC for transgressions, saw his problems multiply ( Byers. 1995 ». He eventually was 
asked to resign in June, 1958.
As commissioner o f the Southwest Conference. Howard Grubbs faced pressure 
because o f a 1956 investigation into v iolations by Bear Bry ant s Texas A&M football 
program. The message was clear. Investigate a power conference team and you 
jeopardize your job (Byers. 1995). Following the retirement of Grubbs in 1973. SWC 
enforcement became far less effective ( Byers, 1995 ).
In 1971. Wayne Duke became the Big Ten Commissioner. After he had 
problems with Michigan, its president. Robben Fleming, pushed through a change in 
Duke's contract, amending it from a multi-year to a year-to-year contract. After retinng 
in 1988. Duke was asked for parting advice for the presidents. Byers reports that he 
responded, ”1 said that a year-to-year contract is a mistake when you made it. and I say it 
again today. One thing the Big Ten needs to do is give my successor a contract and. after 
that, give him your support" ( Byers, 1995, p. 191 )
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As the years passed, fewer and fewer conference commissioners were willing to 
place their careers at risk. Most conference commissioners have decided to let the 
NCAA do it (Byers, 1995). Present-day conference commissioners emphasize 
compliance programs and rules seminars: they leave tough enforcement matters to the 
NCAA (Byers, 1995).
The American Council on Education 
Founded in 1918, the American Council on Education (ACE) represents over 
1,600 colleges and universities. Its purpose is;
to advance education . . . through comprehensive, voluntary , and 
cooperative action on the part o f Amencan educational associations, 
organizations, and institutions . . . and to serve education in such 
undertakings as may be required and approved from year to year, from 
generation to generation for the common welfare ( Funk. 1991. p. 107).
Because o f the link o f athletics w ith higher education, the ACE felt it was within its 
mission to investigate, study, and comment upon intercollegiate sports (Funk. 19911.
In 1952. repeated instances o f scandals related to intercollegiate sports occurred. 
Because of these scandals, ACE funded an investigation (Hardy & Berryman. 1982: 
Thelin. 1994). In the results o f the study, the weak regulatory performance of the NCAA 
was cnticized and the de-emphasis o f sports in college was recommended. In order to 
offset the negative publicity generated by the criticism, the NCAA created the 
Enforcement Decision of 1952: this gave the organization control over rule making and 
over enforcement o f sanctions against violators of rules (Chu. 1982).
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Despite the NCAA's new sanction powers, the ACE continued to be critical o f 
intercollegiate sports. As a result o f a comprehensive study, the ACE called for major 
reforms in college athletics. Derek Bok, head of Harv ard Univ ersity and chair o f ACE, 
appointed a committee of 26 presidents from schools across the country to create a plan 
to implement its recommendations. Their first action was to form a Presidents' Board to 
attempt to take charge of the NCAA ( Sperber. 1990; Byers, 1995 ). A favorable legacy of 
the ACE Special Committee's report was that it showed presidential and institutional 
concern (Thelin, 1994). On the negative side. Scott (1982) viewed the report as a failed 
attempt to curb abuses.
In 1974, George Hanford created a report for the American Council of Education, 
the purpose of which was to get college presidents to confront the future of 
intercollegiate athletics (Hardy &  Berryman. 1982; Thelin, 1994: Durso. 1975: Rooney. 
1980). In the report. Hanford listed the violations that were taking place in 
intercollegiate athletics: they were:
► Alterations of high school transcripts
► Threats to bomb the home of a high school principal who refused to alter a
transcript
*• Changes made in admissions test scores
" Substitutes, including assistant coaches, taking admissions tests
► Ofiering jobs to parents or other relatives of a prospect
► Promising one package of financial aid and delivering another
- Firing from a state job the father o f a prospect w ho enrolled at a university other
than the state team's
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" Tipping or otherwise paying athletes who perform particularly well on a given
occasion
► Providing a community college basketball star with a private apartment and car
► Getting grades for athletes in courses they never attended
► Enrolling university athletes in junior colleges out o f season and getting them 
grades there for courses they never attended
► Using federal work-study funds to pay athletes for questionable or nonexistent 
jobs
► Getting a portion of work-study funds paid to athletes kicked back into the 
athletic department kitt (Denlinger &  Shapiro, 1975, p 249)
Thelin ( 1994 ) reported that Hanford claimed that faculty were relatively 
uninvolved in intercollegiate athletics governance. Hanford also felt that regional 
accreditation associations had abdicated responsibility and should be more active in 
supporting institutional control of athletics: he recommended that a self-study o f athletics 
be required as a requisite to regional accreditation.
Hanford's report, according to Thelin, highlighted the lack o f debate among 
presidents as well as the scholarly inattention to policy issues surrounding college sports. 
Frey felt at the time that inattention from college presidents and faculties might become a 
thing of the past. In fact, the inattention o f presidents to athletics is a charactenstic o f 
the past. The ACE Committee on Division I Athletics pressured the NCAA to include in 
its governance structure a board of presidents with the power to veto or modity NCAA  
rules ( Bok, 1983 ). In January. 1984. this proposal was defeated at the NCAA 
convention: in its place, the NCAA created a Presidents' Commission with limited
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authority It was vested with the power to review NCAA policy and practice, to place 
items on the convention agenda, to conduct studies, and to demand a roll-call vote on any 
council or convention issue. In June. 1985. nearly 200 presidents attended the 
convention and every one o f the Presidents’ Commission proposals passed. In previous 
years, it had been rare to see as many as a dozen presidents at NCAA conventions (Frey, 
1986). The widespread presidential inattention to athletics had come to an end.
Presidents' Commission 
The Presidents' Board, now called the Presidents' Commission, was an attempt at 
presidential, inter-institutional control of athletics. A group of concerned presidents 
from within the American Council on Education met in the early 1980's to discuss ways 
to work within the NCAA to promote increased presidential power in athletics 
( President's Commission Handbook. 1996-97; Bok, 1985: Thelin &  Wiseman, 1989: 
Thelin, 1994: Sperber. 1990: Macmillan. 1992 ). Their rationale was that individual 
presidents are too busy to etTect change within athletics alone. Therefore, they 
recommended forming a presidential board selected by their peers to control the NCAA's 
agenda ( Sperber. 1990).
At the NCAA convention in 1984, the Presidents' Commission was formed as a 
compromise between the ACE presidents and the NCAA (President's Commission 
Handbook. 1996-97: Thelin &  Wiseman. 1989: Sperber, 1990). As a result, it has less 
power than the presidents had sought, but more than the NCAA staff had desired (Thelin 
&  Wiseman. 1989: Thelin. 1994). The commission consists of presidents from all 
divisions, but it is weighted with more Division 1 members. This reflects the attitude that
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problems in athletics belong primarily to big-time programs (Thelin &  Wiseman, 1989). 
The Presidents' Commission is empowered to:
(a) Review any activity of the association,
( b) Place any matter of concern on the agenda for any meeting o f the council
for any NCAA convention.
(c) Request studies o f intercollegiate athletics and urge certain courses o f 
action,
(d) Propose legislation directly to the convention,
(e ) Establish the final sequence o f legislative proposals in any convention
agenda within the provisions o f Section 2-(e) of the Special Rules of 
Order,
( f } Call for a special meeting o f the association under provisions of Article
5 .7 o f the constitution,
(g) Designate before printing notice o f any convention specific proposals for
which a roll-call vote of eligible voters will be mandatory , and 
( h ) .Approve appointment of an executive director of the association
(President's Commission Handbook. 1996-97: Thelin &  Wiseman. 1989 ). 
The commission has made its presence felt through it efforts in a number of 
areas. In 1984, it successfully pressed for legislation establishing minimum academic 
qualifications for participation in intercollegiate sports. Other proposals made by the 
commission and adopted at a special convention in 1984 were: the institutional self- 
study requirement, the differentiation between major and secondary violations o f NC.AA
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legislation and the so called death penalty for repeat offenders, and the annual financial 
audit requirement ( President's Commission Handbook. 1996-97).
In 1987. a special convention was held at the request o f a delegation from ACE 
regarding the issues of playing-season limitations and cost-containment. While several 
of the commission's recommendations regarding spring football practice and reductions 
in grants-in-aid in the v arious sports were not successful, the membership did approve 
establishment o f an 18-month National Forum on the proper role o f intercollegiate 
athletics in higher education, as well as a series o f research studies in that regard. It also 
adopted the proposals calling for studies o f financial aid limitations, numbers of 
individuals involved on noninstitutional athletics staffs, limits on recruiting penods, and 
the effects of varsity participation on the academic performance and collegiate 
experience o f freshman student-athletes (President's Commission Handbook. 1996-97).
National Forums were held in Nashville in January, 1988 (featuring economic 
considerations in athletics): in Orlando in June. 1988 (emphasizing the NCAA 
membership structure. NCAA legislative and governance procedures, and financial aid): 
and m San Francisco in January , 1989, at the annual convention (highlighting the effects 
of intercollegiate athletics participation on the student-athlete) (President's Commission 
Handbook- 1996-97).
As a result o f these sessions, the Presidents' Commission sponsored four 
successful legislative proposals at the 1990 NCAA Convention dealing with the 
disclosure o f graduation rates: the reduction of time demands on student-athletes; the 
reinstating of the partial qualifier in Division 1 and permitting such individuals to 
received need-based, non-athletically related financial aid: and permitting incoming
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student-athletes to received non-athletically related financial aid to attend summer school 
prior to their full-time enrollment (President's Commission Handbook. 1996-97).
The Commission met with success again the following year when it developed a 
group of proposals that became known as the "reform agenda. " Eight o f the ten 
proposals were adopted at the 1991 convention (President's Commission Handbook. 
1996-97).
In 1992. the emphasis o f the Presidents' Commission shifted to matters of 
presidential authority and institutional control. The Commission sponsored nine 
proposals at the 1993 Convention —  highlighted by the establishment o f an athletics 
certification program in Div ision I —  and all were adopted except for a portion of one 
amendment. In addition, the Presidential Agenda Day was implemented at that 
Convention, grouping in one specified day all legislation identified as being o f particular 
interest to CEO's (President's Commission Handbook. 1996-97).
In 1996. the primary focus of legislation supported by the Presidents' Commission 
was the restructuring the association. A central goal was to affirm presidential control of 
and responsibility for the NCAA. In 1997. the Commission was replaced by a new 
Executive Committee composed exclusively o f CEO'S and division-specific presidential 
bodies in each of the three divisions (President's Commission Handbook. 1996-97).
Presidents have difficulty making headway on their own campuses unless they 
can act within a common framework o f collective rules that will maintain adequate 
minimum academic standards (Bok, 1983). It appears by the results o f the Presidents' 
Commission at the NCAA conferences that presidents are well on the way to making the 
maintenance of adequate minimum academic standards a reality.
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The Knight Commission 
In 1989, after a decade o f highly visible athletic scandals, the Knight Commission 
was formed with a S2 million grant from the Knight Foundation to propose a reform 
agenda for college sports ( Mallette &  Howard, 1992). The report which resulted from 
this study on intercollegiate athletics was called "Keeping Faith with the 
Student-Athlete” (Thelin, 1994). The trustees o f the John S. and James L. Knight 
Foundation were concerned that ". . athletic abuses threatened the very integrity o f
higher education " (Knight Foundation, 1993, p. 10).
The Knight Commission Report described athletic abuses in the 1980’s that led to 
the NCAA's censuring, sanctioning, or placing on probation 109 colleges and universities 
(Fleisher, 1992 ). This group included more than half the universities playing at the 
NCAA's top competitive level—57 ( 54"o ) of 106 institutions. Evidence from nearly 
one-third of present and former professional football players who responded to a surv ey 
near the end of the decade indicated that they had accepted illicit payments while m 
college. In addition, more than half said they saw nothing wrong with the practice. 
Another survey showed that among 100 big-time schools. 35 had graduation rates o f less 
than 20“o for their basketball players: 14 had the same low rate for their football play ers.
In spite of these indicators o f embarrassing scandals, the Knight Commission did 
not approach college sports with a hostile attitude. Chairman James Knight said:
We have a lot o f sports fans on our board, and we recognize that 
intercollegiate athletics have a legitimate and proper role to play in 
college and university life. Our interest is not to abolish that role but to 
preserve it by putting it back in perspective. We hope this Commission
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can strengthen the hands o f those who want to curb the abuses which are 
shaking public confidence in the integrity o f not just big-time collegiate 
athletics but the whole institution o f higher education. ( Knight 
Foundation. 1993. p. 10)
The Knight Commission was attempting to do the same as President Roosevelt 
had in 1905—to reform instead of abolish intercollegiate sports. Yet as Creed Black, the 
president of the Knight Foundation, stated. "Public faith in higher education cannot be 
sustained if  college sports are permitted to become a circus, with the institution itself 
little more than a supporting sideshow" (Thelin, 1994, p. 147)
The central concept proffered by the Knight Commission is that intercollegiate 
athletics should reflect the values o f the university: therefore, the regulatory process 
should be grounded in the primacy o f academic values (Thelin. 1994). Those taking part 
in athletics should be student-athletes. To accomplish reform in this area, the 
commission created a "one-plus-three" model. The "one” is presidential control 
directed toward the "three" principles of academic integrity, financial integrity, and 
accountability through certification ( Fleisher. 1992: Thelin. 1994: Macmillan. 1992).
The Knight Commission made a number o f recommendations for advancing 
presidential control. The first recommendation was that governing boards ". . explicitly 
endorse and reaffirm presidential authority in all matters o f athletics governance”
(Knight Foundation, 1993, p . l2 ) . All financial matters in the athletics program were to 
be delegated specifically to the president. It urged that the governing board assist the 
president in establishing common principles for hiring, evaluating, and terminating all 
athletic administrators, and it also affirmed the president's central authority in this role.
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A governing board’s expectations o f the president regarding athletics should be clear and 
the board should take responsibility for reviewing the program annually. Finally, the 
governing board should help the president to define the faculty 's role in terms of 
academic issues in athletics (Knight Foundation, 1993).
The second recommendation of the Knight Commission was that presidents 
should act on their obligation to control NCAA conferences (Knight Foundation, 1993, p. 
13). The Commission felt strongly that presidents should formally retain the authority to 
define agendas: offer motions: cast votes or provide voting instructions: and to review 
and. i f  necessary, reshape conference decisions. In so doing, the president influences 
shaping the academic goals o f the conference ( 1993 ).
The third recommendation for enhancing presidential control was that presidents 
should maintain control the NCAA (Knight Foundation, 1993, p. 12) This includes 
making informed use o f their votes on the NCAA convention floor, following up on the 
success of the Presidents' Commission with additional reform measures, and continuing 
to fight for athletic reform.
Presidential control must be directed to academic integrity: academic integrity 
includes the fundamental premise that athletes must be students. It is comprised of the 
areas of admission, academic progress, and graduation rates. To promote academic 
integrity , the Knight Commission recommended that the NCAA strengthen initial 
eligibility requirements, link athletic eligibility to progress towards a degree, and use 
graduation rates as a criterion for NCAA certification ( Knight Foundation, 1993, p. 18).
The commission further recommended that presidential control should also be 
directed toward financial integrity. Financial integrity consists o f reducing the costs of
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athletics and recommending that grants-in-aid cover the full costs of attendance for the 
very needy. It includes the curbing of independence o f athletics foundations and booster 
clubs, the reviewing and approving by each university o f all athletics-related coaches' 
income, otiering long-term contracts to coaches, and financially supporting 
intercollegiate athletics by each institution (Knight Foundation, 1993).
Finally, presidential control should be directed to the independent authentication 
by an outside body o f the integrity of each institution's athletics program. The 
commission recommended that the NCAA extend the certification process to all 
institutions granting athletics aid. They further recommended that each university should 
undertake comprehensive, annual policy audits o f their athletics program. In addition, 
this certification program should include the major themes put forth in the Knight 
Commission's report (Knight Foundation. 1993).
A pnmary contribution o f the Knight Commission's report has been to bnng 
together college presidents to face serious issues involving intercollegiate athletics 
(Theliru 1994). Thelin pointed out that the 1929 Carnegie Report, the ACE Reports of 
1952 and 1974. and the Knight Commission Report all emphasized that college 
presidents must be centrally involved. All warned against commercialization and 
portray ed excesses o f recruitment, athletic scholarships, and special pnvi leges as 
corruptions o f student athlete ideals. However, all reports suggested that intercollegiate 
athletics be balanced not abolished.
Summary
Intercollegiate sports competition made its first appearance in 1852 with a
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student-organized crew race between Yale and Harvard; a second race followed in 1855. 
Conflicts and disagreements arose almost immediately and the issue of governance of 
intercollegiate sports was bom. In this chapter, the literature related to the history of 
intercollegiate sports since that first race was reviewed. The literature traced the 
governance of athletics from students, faculty, alumni. NCAA to eventual institutional 
control by the CEO. The research o f the literature has shown repeated unsuccessful 
attempts in controlling intercollegiate athletics.
The complex governance structure o f the institution and the traditional 
independence o f institutional units including that o f athletics has been shown to 
contribute to the difficulty o f controlling intercollegiate athletics. Another factor that has 
been discussed as a contributing element is the ability of athletics to forge strong ties to 
external forces such as boosters. Despite these problems and difficulties, the NCAA as 
well as other organizations and many authors have called for strong presidential 
leadership in the institutional control of athletics. It is this issue of institutional control 
of athletics that led to this studv.
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CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY
In this chapter, the research methods used to determine the existence o f 
institutional control o f collegiate athletic programs are described. Based on this 
research, recommendations in areas o f improvement in institutional control over NCAA 
Division I athletics for the future can be made.
Selection o f Population and Subjects 
The total population o f 275 NCAA Division I colleges and universities listed in 
the 19%'97 National Directory o f College Athletics were selected for use in determining 
and comparing the existence o f control because a large proportion o f Division 1 schools 
have been cited for lack of institutional control. The chief executive officer, usually the 
president or chancellor, and the athletics director o f each institution were surv eyed 
regarding the issue of institutional control of athletics.
Survey Questionnaires 
Two separate questionnaires were designed, one for the chief executive officers 
and one for the athletics directors. The questionnaires consisted of both specific and 
open-ended questions the subjects o f which included the principles of institutional
68
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control suggested by the Knight Commission and the NCAA Committee on Infractions as 
well as other literature on the subject.
The queries were designed to allow subjects to express their feelings about the 
extent and ongins o f control of athletics at their institutions. The surv ey was in booklet 
form, laid out so that it was easily read: the number o f  questions was limited so that the 
survey could be completed in thirty minutes or less. The questions were divided into 
groups, mixing easily-answered questions with the more time-consuming questions so 
that the survey would not be monotonous or boring to complete.
The survey was sent by first-class mail with a cover letter from the researcher 
indicating the purpose o f the study. A second mailing took place approximately thirty 
days after the first in order to increase the rate o f return. A total o f 149 survey s were 
returned from athletics directors and 1Ü7 from chief executive officers. The final return 
rates were 54“b and 39® o respectively resulting in a combined return rate of 47® o (256 
surveys ).
Reliability o f the Survey Instrument 
A large population size was used to correct for random error. This consisted of 
the chief executive officers and athletics directors from the entire list o f NCAA Div ision 
1 institution. In addition, the reliability of the questionnaires was tested by employing a 
panel o f experts from the University of Nevada, Las Vegas, the site o f the research. The 
panel consisted of Dr. Carol Harter, President o fU N LV : Dr. Anthony Saville. professor 
in the College of Education: Dr. Brad Rothermel, former athletics director of UNLV: 
Charlie Cavagnaro, current UNLV Athletics Director: Dave Chambers, UNLV
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Compliance Officer: and Dr James Frey, UNLV sociologist. Test-retest with 
altemate-forms was employed with the panel
Face Validity o f the Survey Instrument 
Face validity was established in a preliminary test before assessing content 
validity . A number of athletics personnel at the University o f Nevada, Las Vegas, such 
as the assistant athletic directors and the compliance officers, were given the survey 
instrument to confirm that the questions were reasonable and appropriate. These 
personnel were considered to be semi-expert on the subject matter.
Content Validity of the Survey Instrument 
The panel of experts from UNLV focused on testing for content validity o f the 
questionnaire. The panel members were asked to review each question to confirm that its 
answ er would be relevant in assessing the status of the institutional control of athletics.
The Pilot Study
A pilot study was conducted to identity errors and weaknesses in the survey's 
form and presentation such as typographical mistakes, overlapping response sets, 
ambiguous instructions, and overly long or tedious format. A panel of experts consisting 
of chief executive officers and athletics directors of Division 1 institutions was used in 
the pilot study. The panel consisted o f Dr. Carol Harter, President o f UNLV: Dr. Pat 
Goodall, former President of UNLV: Dr. Don Baepler, former President of UNLV: Dr. 
Robert Maxson, President o f Long Beach State: Charlie Cavagnaro, current UNLV  
Athletics Director: Dr. Brad Rothermel, former Athletics Director of UNLV : Steve
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Holton. Athletics Director, Northern Anzona University : John Kasser. Athletics Director, 
University of California: and Bill Shumard. Athletics Director, Long Beach State.
The panel employed the following checklist to analyze the survey instrument;
* Are there any typographical errors?
* Are there any misspelled words?
* Do the items measure the existence of institutional control?
* Are there any other relevant measures for institutional control that should
be added?
* Do the item numbers make sense?
* Is the type size big enough to be easily read?
* Is the vocabulary appropriate for the respondents?
* Is the survey too long?
* Is the style o f the items too monotonous?
* Are there easy questions in with the difficult questions’^
* Does the survey format flow well?
* Are the items appropriate for the respondents?
Data Collection
The surveys were mailed on September 30th. 1997 A self-addressed, stamped 
envelope was included for returning the questionnaire to the researcher The respondent 
was asked to return the questionnaire within four weeks. The return rate from this 
mailing was 32“o. On November 16, 1997, those who had not responded were sent a
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follow-up letter and another copy of the questionnaire. This resulted in the return o f an 
additional 15“ o for a total response rate o f 47® o.
Data Analysis
Nominal and ordinal data were collected through percentage, yes-and-no, ratings 
of agreement, and scales. The open-ended questions were coded for patterns and themes 
according to accepted methodologies.
The yes-and-no questions were used to determine if a specific strategy or element 
of institutional control existed at the institutions. A mean score, median, and mode for 
each element o f institutional control was calculated from the completed surveys.
The ratings-of-agreement scale employed was a Likert-type using the categories 
of "Stronulv Agree." "Agree." "Undecided." "Disagree" and "Stronalv Disagree." The 
scale was used to determine the extent to which the elements o f institutional control 
existed or were utilized.
The percentage scale was blocked from Ü to 100® o in 10® o interv als. These scales 
were used to determine the degree of selected issues o f institutional control. For 
example, regarding the issue of the amount o f money awarded from the state to fund the 
athletics program, 0® o would indicate that all revenue would have to be generated from 
donations from private sources while 100® o would indicate that there was no need to 
generate revenue from private sources. The conclusion would be that more control over 
athletics would exist by an institution that did not need to generate private donations. A 
mean score, median score, and mode for each percentage scale was calculated from the 
completed surveys. The open-ended questions were utilized primarily in order to identify
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strategies for. or elements of, mstimtional control o f athletics that might not have shown 
up in the research o f the literature. A list o f strategies and elements was then assembled 
based on identified data. This list was used to create guidelines for institutions and the 
NCAA w ho may w ish to test for or to implement increased institutional control o f 
athletics.
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CHAPTER 4 
DISCUSSION OF THE RESULTS 
Introduction
In this chapter, the information collected from responses to the research 
questionnaires is presented and discussed. The questionnaires were completed and 
returned by the chief executive officers and the athletics directors at the 275 NCAA 
Division I colleges and universities listed in the 1996/97 National Directory of College 
Athletics.
The purpose of this investigation was to determine the current status of 
institutional control of athletics programs at the Division 1 schools by identifying the 
sources and levels of control and the methods by which control was exercised and to 
determine where problems with control exist. The questionnaire used to obtain this 
information was designed with the following questions in mind:
1. To what degree and with what strategies was control exercised by the 
chief executive officer of the institution ’
2. In what ways and to what extent was institutional control facilitated or 
inhibited bv the governing board of the institution ’
74
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3. In what ways did financial and operational policies o f the institution 
influence and affect control o f athletics’
4. In what ways were athletics directors involved in the institution's control 
of athletics?
5 In what ways were the school's boosters and alumni affecting the 
institution’s control of athletics?
The Governing Board
Control o f athletics at a college or university begins with its governing board. 
However, as Slaughter ( 1989) points ouL it is important that the governing board resist 
the temptation to micromanage the daily life on campus. When a board involves itself in 
micro-managing, says Slaughter, it undermines the authority of its chief executive 
officer. Rather than attempting to directly manage athletics themselves, boards need to 
delegate the full authority for control of the athletics programs to their CEO's and to 
support them in exercising that authority. This need arises from the fact that it is the 
chief executive officer, not the governing board, who has traditionally been identified as 
the one bearing the responsibility for control o f the athletics program (Smith. 1988: 
Thelin. 1989).
The governing board's delegation of authority to its president should be clearly 
articulated in its mission statement. In addition, a governing board should assist its CEO 
by drafting a mission statement in which it defines the role of athletics at the institution: 
this provides guidelines and standards within which the CEO can assert control. As 
Table 1 show s, questionnaire responses indicated that a majority of governing boards
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have written mission statements in which they define the role o f athletics. However, a
number o f respondents 16® o of athletics directors and 2 !®o o f presidents) indicated that
their institution has no such mission statement.
Table 1 ; Mission Statement Concerning Role o f Athletics
Question; "Does the governing board have a mission statement concerning the role o f 
athletics at vour university ?“
Response Yes No Totals
Athletics Director Frequency 131 8 139
Percent 94% 6% 100%!
Chief Executive Officer Frequency 84 22 106
Percent 79% 21% 100%
A larger majority o f boards, according to respondents, have addressed the issue o f 
delegation o f authority to the CEO. Fewer than 2® o of AD's and 5® b o f CEO's either 
disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement, "The governing board o f your 
institution has a clearly articulated mission statement concerning the authority of the 
chief executive officer. ”
Another issue involving the governing board concerns the degree to which the 
board is supportive o f presidential authority at their institution. As Table 2 shows: the 
majority o f both chief executive officers and athletics directors ( 78® o in both cases) 
strongly agreed that their governing board is supportive o f presidential authority at their 
institution. O f the remainders, almost all agreed that their CEO receives the support of 
the board. Less than l°o  o f respondents indicated either neutrality or disagreement with 
this statement.
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Table 2; Governing Board Support o f Presidential Authority
Statement; "The governing board is supportive of chief executive officer authority at 
vour institution."
Strongly Strongly
Response Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Disagree Totals
Athletics Director Frequency 110 30 1 0 0 141
Percent 78% 21% 1% 0% 0% 100%
Chief Executive Officer Frequency 82 22 1 0 0 105
___ _______ Percent 78% _21% ___ 1 % ____ 0% 0% 100%
On the other hand, although they felt that the boards are supportive of the
president's authority in managing the athletics program, a majority —  65®o of the
presidents and 70% o f the athletics directors —  also either strongly agreed or agreed that
their governing boards expect winning programs.
Table 3; Governing Board Expectations Regarding Wins
Statement; "The governing board o f your institution expects the athletics department to 
have winning programs."
Response
Strongly
Agree Agree Neutral Disagree
Strongly
Disagree Totals
Athletics Director Frequency 15 84 25 16 1 141
Percent 11% 60% 18% 11% 1% 100%
Chief Executive Officer Frequency 12 56 15 16 6 105
Percent 11% 53% 14% 15% 6% 100%
The board’s expectations o f a winning program does not in itself constitute a 
problem. However, it could translate into pressure from the governing board on the chief 
executive and the athletics director and, in turn, on the coaches. This could constitute a 
problem because pressure to win can translate into a win-at-al 1-costs attitude ( Rooney. 
1980). It can become so intense that coaches and athletes, as well as the university 
administration, sometimes put athletic success ahead of educational achievement 
(Simon, 1985). When governing boards expect coaches to win. a situation can be created
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whereby the coaches believe that it is more likely that they will be fired for not winning 
than that they will be fired for violating NCAA rules (. Davies. 1995: Frey. 1994).
The extent o f the financial support which the governing board provides for the 
operation of the athletics department can result in yet another pressure on the coaches I f  
the financial support provided by the board is not enough for the athletics department to 
be self-sufficient, the institution will of necessity search externally for revenue to fund 
the program ( Riley &  Baldridge. 1977). This external revenue will come either from 
boosters seeking control or from the gate receipts from winning programs {Atwell, 
Grimes, &  Lopiano, 1980: Riley &  Baldridge, 1977).
The questionnaire results shown in Table 4 make it evident that many chief 
executive officers believe that the governing board of their institutions does not provide 
enough financial support for the athletics department to be self-sufficient.
Table 4: Extent o f Financial Support
Statement: "The governing board provides enough financial support to your institution 
for the athletics department to be self-sufficient."
Strongly Strongly
_________Response Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Disagree Totals
Frequency 8 34 13 30 13 98
Percent 8% 35% 13% 31% 13% 100%
This question was asked of the CEO's alone. Those chief executive officers who 
responded either "Strongly Agree " or "Agree " total 43® o. The total for those w ho 
disagreed or strongly disagreed was 44%. According to this, almost half of the 
institutions underfund their athletics departments. It is probable that these institutions 
are searching externally for revenue to fund their athletics programs.
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The Athletics Director 
The athletics directors are critical elements in the institutional control of 
athletics. Many problems in college athletics can be traced to the fact that athletics 
directors, coaches, and athletics departments have operated separately from institutions, 
with little or no accountability to the president or chancellor ( Lapchick 1987: Thelin, 
1989). Chief executive officers have learned of their communities' lust for w inning, and 
most choose not to be in the direct firing line should athletic problems erupt: they are 
thereby abetting this independence o f AD's ( Miller, 1982 ). Some athletics directors, 
hung out on a limb, have been chewed up like confetti, as have head coaches and 
assistant coaches in such high pressure sports as football and basketball (Miller. 1982). 
However, chief executive officers can no longer ignore the problems of athletics. They 
have been mandated to take control and bring athletics back into the fold of the 
institution (Knight Commission 1991: Miller. 1982: Scott, 1982: Slaughter. 1989).
A key aspect o f institutional control involves the role o f the athletics director at 
the institution. Potential problems exist when the duties o f the athletics director include 
coaching responsibilities. As Thelin {1989 ) pointed out. "The dual role of head coach 
and athletics director is a dangerous concentration of roles and powers, is increasingly 
rare, and often signals an institution more concerned with emphasizing one or two sports 
at the expense of a balanced, equitable intercollegiate sports program” (p. 92). The 
surv ey results showed that 97% of institutions have separated the athletics directors from 
coaching responsibilities.
The athletics director o f an institution is critical to the institutional control o f 
athletics. I f  the athletics director is not supportive of presidential authority, then control
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o f athletics is more difficult to attain. The responses to the survey were almost
unanimous in either agreeing or strongly agreeing that athletics directors are supportive
o f presidential authority .
Table 5: Support for Presidential Authority by Athletics Director
Statement: "The athletics director at your institution is supportive o f presidential 
authority.”
Strongly
Response Agree Agree Neutral Totals
Athletics Director Frequency 128 15 0 143
Percent 90% 10% 0% 100%
Chief Executive Officer Frequency 89 16 1 106
Percent 84% 15% 1% 100%
Similarly , all CEO's indicated that the athletics director at their institution is committed 
to NCAA rules education compliance.
A major issue for the institutional control of athletics is the relationship between 
the athletics department and the success o f its programs. The chief executive officers 
are, in many cases, faced with the same pressures as the athletics directors and the 
coaches. They can be fired for the same reason as the football coach is fired (Scott.
1982, p. 35 ). Every one agrees that losing games can get you fired ( Denlinger &  Shapiro. 
1975: Fleisher, 1992: Frey, 1988, 1994: Funk. 1991 : Guttman. 1982. 1988: Isaacs. 1978: 
Hart-Nibbng &  Cottingham. 1989: Simon, 1985: Smith, 198: Rooney. 1980). On the 
other hand, if  coaches feel they must win at all costs, or break NCAA rules in order to 
win. then athletics scandals can occur. Blackburn and Nykos ( 1974 ) commented. " I f  the 
team falters, if  scandal clouds the campus, i f  the university is embarrassed, the president 
almost always takes substantial blame" (p. 65 ).
One situation that can lead to this is when athletics directors expect coaches to
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have winning programs as the highest priority. The data in Table 6 shows that many
athletics directors do expect coaches to have w inning programs: 39*^  o o f them said that
they agreed or strongly agreed that this is true.
Table 6; Athletics Director's Expectations o f Coaches
Statement: "The athletics director at your institution expects coaches to have winning 
programs."
Strongly Strongly
Response Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Disagree Totals
Frequency 7 49 11 61 15 143
Percent 5% 34% 8% 43% 10% I00“o
When the same question was asked o f CEO's, their responses showed that many
more o f them feel that AD's expect their coaches to have winning teams. Ninety-three
percent of respondents either agreed or strongly agreed with the statement.
Table 7: Athletics Director’s Expectations o f Coaches (According to CEO's)
Statement: "The athletics director at your institution expects coaches to have winning 
programs.”
Response
Strongly
Agree Agree Neutral Disagree
Strongly
Disagree Totals
Frequency
Percent
24
23%
74
70%
4
4%
3
3%
1
1%
106
100%
This expectation by athletics directors that their coaches have winning programs does not 
necessarily mean that the coaches will cheat. However, it does reflect a pressure that 
would add to the temptation for a coach to cheat in order to win.
A related issue concerns whether or not the athletics director at an institution 
believes the stability of his or her position depends on having winning programs. The 
data in Table 8 shows that a substantial number o f respondents (40® o o f AD's and 469 b of 
CEO's) felt that athletics directors believed the stability of their position depends on
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having winning programs. Again, this does not necessarily mean that pressure would be 
put on coaches to win, but it is certainly an element that could contribute to the 
temptation to cheat.
Table 8: Stability o f Athletics Director Position
Statement: "The athletics director at your institution believes the stability of his or her 
position depends on having winning athletics programs."
Strongly Strongly
Response Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Disagree Totals
Athletics Director Frequency 2 56 15 64 6 143
Percent 1% 39% 10% 45% 4% 100%
Chief Executive Officer Frequency 7 41 16 36 6 106
Percent 7% 39% 15% 34% 6% 100%
A parallel issue concerns coaches and whether or not they believe the stability of
their positions depends on having a winning program. Coaches can be under intense
pressure to produce victones: i f  they believe the stability o f their position depends on
having winning programs, there is a chance they will cheat to win. In addition, these
pressures, combined with the tremendous monetary and material rewards available to
successful Division 1 coaches, motivate some in the business to use any means necessary
to secure the skilled athlete (Funk, 1991 ).
Table 9: Stability o f Football and Basketball Coaches Positions
Statement: "Football and basketball coaches at your institution believe the stability of 
their positions depends on having a winning program."
I Strongly [ f Strongly
Athletics Director Frequency 20 90 9 21 3 143
Percent 14% 63% 6% 15% 2% 100%
Chief Executive Officer Frequency 17 71 5 12 1 106
Percent 16% 67% 5% 11% 1% 100%
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The data in Table 9 shows that 83® o o f chief executiv e officers and 77® o of
athletics directors strongly agreed or agreed that football and basketball coaches at their
institutions believe the stability of their positions depends on having a winning program.
The same question was asked of both chief executive officers and athletics directors in
regard to coaches of Olympics sports (track, tennis, golf. etc. ); the results were similar
—  5 l®o of CEO's and 50® b of AD's either agreed or strongly agreed that these coaches
believe their positions are reliant on winning: this is shown in Table 10.
Table 10: Stability o f Position o f Olympic Sport Coaches
Statement: "Olympic sports coaches (tennis, soccer, golf, etc. ) at your institution believe 
the stability o f their positions depend on having a winning program."
Response
Strongly
Agree Agree Neutral Disagree
Strongly
Disagree Totals
Athletics Director Frequency 4 68 17 50 4 143
Percent 3% 47% 12% 35% 3% 100%
Chief Executive Officer Frequency 5 48 20 27 4 104
Percent 5% 46% 19% 26% 4% 100%
Another potential problem for the institutional control o f athletics exists when the 
contracts o f coaches contain athletics performance clauses that could cause the contracts 
to be non-renewed. Coaches are extremely competitive anyway , as Sperber ( 1990 ) 
pointed out: they can be so obsessed with winning that they will bend or break the rules 
to obtain the winning edge. Performance clauses that could cause non-renewal increase 
the chances that coaches w ill feel the pressure to break NCAA rules. Dennis Wagner 
( 1997) o f the Arizona Republic said that "College coaches get caught between the NCAA 
rule book and the knowledge that their careers depend on winning" (p. 203 ). Frey ( 1994) 
said it more plainly: " If  you lose your games, you are certain to be fired. I f  you break the 
rules, vou have to be caught to be fired" (p. 6). The data collected in the survey showed
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that many coaches in Division I athletics did indeed have performance clauses that could
cause their contracts to be non-renewed. The question was asked of the athletics
directors: the results are shown in Table 11.
Table 11: Performance Clauses for Football and Basketball Coaches
Question: Do the contracts o f football and basketball coaches contain athletics
performance clauses that could cause the contracts to be non-renewed?"
Response Yes No Totals
Frequency 35 107 142
Percent 25% 75% 100%
According to respondents, a majority o f coaches ( 75%) do not have performance
clauses in their contracts: 25% constitutes a significant number, however, that do have
clauses that can result in their losing their jobs i f  their teams do not win. This is enough
to pose majors problems for institutional control.
The same question was asked o f AD's concerning performance clauses in the
contracts o f Olympic sports coaches. The data in Table 12 indicates that some Olympics
sports coaches did have performance clauses in their contracts.
Table 12: Performance clauses for Olympic Sports Coaches
Question: "Do the contracts o f Olympic sports coaches ( tennis, soccer, golf, etc ) contain 
athletics performance clauses that could cause the contracts to be 
non-renewed?"
Response Yes No Totals
Frequency 24 118 142
Percent 17% 83% 100%
The survey responses indicated that fewer Olympic sports coaches have contracts 
containing performance clauses that can result in non-renewal. However. 17®o still
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represents a significant number of coaches who face losing their jobs i f  they fail to have 
a winning team.
Another area that is important to institutional control o f athletics concerns 
whether or not the athletics director makes it clear that he or she demands compliance 
with NCAA regulations. The data collected showed that this is not a problem. Almost all 
of chief executive officers (99%) and athletics directors (98%) indicated that the AD at 
their institution does make it clear that he or she demands compliance with NCAA rules 
and that they will not tolerate those who deliberately violate the rules or do so through 
gross negligence.
Also important to the matter o f institutional control o f athletics is the attitude of 
a school's athletics director about its educational goals. Kjeldsen ( 1992) stated that 
presidents must actively participate in athletic governance by holding athletics directors 
accountable for contributing to the educational goals and principles o f the university.
Here too the responses were almost unanimous; 99® o of CEO's indicated that they believe 
that the athletics director at their institution agrees with the educational goals of the 
school. In the same way, the attitude o f the coaches toward their schools' educational 
goals is important. Again, the data showed no problem at all in this area.
Questions designed to determine i f  coaches have a clear understanding of their 
role within the university, if  they understand and adhere to NCAA rules, and if  they are 
committed to NCAA rules compliance were asked in the questionnaire. The responses 
indicated that there were no problems felt to exist in these areas.
Table 13 shows the responses by athletics directors asked to name the greatest 
threat to institutional control at their schools. The most frequently identified threat was
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boosters: it was listed 37 times as the greatest threat to the institutional control o f
athletics. Better education and educational brochures and guides for boosters, coaches,
and students were mentioned as the best methods to lesson the impact of this threat.
Better monitonng and enforcement procedures were mentioned five times frequently as
other suggested methods.
Table 13: Threats to the Control o f Athletics
Question (to AD's): "What is the greatest threat to institutional control o f athletics at
vour institution?"
Response Frequency Percent
Boosters 37 28%
Agents 17 13%
External Force 14 11%
Monev. Funding. Resources 12 9%
Coaches 10 8%
Alumni 8 6%
NCAA & Regulations 5 4%
Staff 5 4%
Winning at All Costs 4 3%
Athletes 4 3%
Lack of Compliance Staff 3 2%
Regents 3 2%
Lack of Understanding 3 2%
Gambling 2 2%
Media 2 2%
The President 1 1%
Faculty 1 1%
Totals 131 100%
Professional agents were the second most frequently identified threat to the 
institutional control of athletics. Better education, educational brochures and guides for 
coaches and students was mentioned by everyone as a method to lesson the impact of this 
threat on institutional control. A few athletics directors mentioned working closely with 
the NC AA and their respective state governments on registration of agents programs.
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Better compliance, monitoring, and enforcement policies were also mentioned as good 
methods
Another open-ended question designed to gather comments from AD's asked
them to identify strategies that they have used to establish or reestablish the institutional
control o f athletics? The responses are tabulated in Table 14.
Table 14; Strategies to Establish Control
Question (to AD's): "Name three strategies that you have used to establish or reestablish 
institutional control of athletics. "
Response Frequency Percent
Education 53 22%
Compliance 47 19%
Athletic Department 25 10%
'olicy. Procedures. Goals 24 10%
Audits. Reviews, etc. 23 9%
Hinng & Firing 12 5%
Athletics Council 10 4%
^resident 9 4%
Athletics Director 8 3%
-inancial a 3%
Communication 6 2%
Conference & NCAA 5 2%
Coaches 3 1%
Board of Regents 3 1%
Administration 3 1%
"acuity Athletics Rep 2 1%
Contracts 2 1%
ISÎâi___________________ 243 100%
The most commonly named strateg)'. listed 53 times, was education. Specific 
educational activities named included: reviewing rules and regulations with staff and 
coaches: reinforcing the need for compliance: stressing rules and regulations with student 
athletes: educating about and stressing the goals, missions, and rules expectations: 
educating the facult\ athletics representative: educating the boosters and alumni: using
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educational pamphlets, programs and mandatory seminars; holding regular meetings with 
the faculty athletics board; arranging professional improvement seminars; and writing 
reminders o f Can Do" and "Cannot Do" to boosters and alumni.
The second most frequently listed strateg} used by athletics directors to establish 
or reestablish institutional control was the compliance office which was listed 47 times. 
Specific activities named in this area were vaned; they included: developing a strong 
compliance office emphasizing institutional control: scrutinizing applicable rules more 
closely: committing support to the compliance officer, conducting compliance audits: 
maintaining compliance records detailing recruiting, fund raising, playing seasons, and 
practice sessions activities: employing a full time compliance officer directing functions 
and education o f coaches, staff, alumni, and boosters: implementing compliance policies 
and procedures: detailing a checks and balance system: emphasizing importance of the 
office: improving the monitoring program: making every one a part o f the compliance 
team: and using technology to monitor management and rules compliance.
The Chief Executive Officer 
At the heart of institutional control o f athletics is the chief executive officer. It is 
the CEO whom the NCAA has identified as the person ultimately responsible for control. 
The Knight Commission (1991) stated that presidents have a responsibility to act (p. 181) 
while Kjeldsen ( 1982) declared that it is the presidents on whom improvement in 
intercollegiate athletics depends. Many others have also called for presidents to take 
action to assert control of athletics (ACE, 1979: Hartford, 1976: Lapchick, 1987: Smith, 
1988: Thelin, 1989. 1994).
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First and foremost, the CEO must make it clear that he or she demands 
compliance with NCAA rules and regulations and will not tolerate those who \iolate 
those rules either deliberately or through gross negligence. Almost all survey 
respondents either strongly agreed or agreed that they do so Howev er, the survey also 
showed that in many cases, it is not the chief executive officer who directly supervises 
the school’s athletics directors; 39® o of AD's and 45“ o o f CEO's identified someone other 
than the school's CEO as the direct supervisor of the athletics director. In those cases, it 
is possible that the strength of the CEO's demands regarding strict rules compliance is 
diluted to some degree by the fact of an intermediate supervisor.
Like the AD's. the chief executive officers were asked to identify the greatest 
threat to institutional control of athletics at their institution. Their responses are shown 
in Table 15:
Table 15: Threats to Control o f Athletics
Question (to CEO): "What is the greatest threat to institutional control of athletics at
vour institution?
Response Frequency Percent
Boosters 22 27%
Monev. Fundino. Resources 16 20%
Coaches 9 11%
Agents 9 11%
External Force 4 5%
Staff 3 4%
NCAA & Regulations 3 4%
Athletes 2 2%
Winning at All Costs 2 2%
Television 2 2%
Alumni 2 2%
Regents 2 2%
Lack of Understanding 2 2%
Faculty 1 1%
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Athletics Director 1 1%
Compliance 1 1%
Lack of Compliance Staff 1 1%
Media 1 1%
Athletics Department 1 1%
Totals 82 100%
The CEO's, like the athletics directors, identified boosters as the greatest threat to 
the institutional control o f athletics. Specifically identified were those boosters who are 
overzealous with no personal risk at stake, who are uneducated and uninformed about 
NCAA rules and regulations, who interfere, who want to win at all costs, who are 
renegade supporters, who involve themselves in improper relations with students and 
coaches, and who are out o f control.
Better education and educational brochures and guides for boosters, coaches, and 
students were named as the best methods to lessen the impact of this threat. Other 
suggestions included consolidating all boosters groups and placing them under the 
control of the institution, requiring that all booster funds be deposited under the 
budgetary control o f the institution, conducting periodic audits of expenditures, 
strengthening procedures for monitoring and enforcement, and stating policies more 
clearly. Also, two chief executive officers stressed the need for a strong athletics director 
with a high level of integrity as key to controlling the threat that boosters can pose.
The CEO's, again like the AD's. identified money-related issues as the second 
greatest threat to institutional control. Specific circumstances named were lack of 
adequate financial resources, loss o f fiscal integrity , increases in dependence on external 
financial support from boosters, budget difficulties, cost increases, the need to produce 
income, lack of institutional f undin a. and the areed o f a small number of Division 1A
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institutions. The actions recommended by the CEO's to lessen the impact on control 
were tightening of fiscal controls: establishing a balance between self-generated revenue 
and institutional funds: better promoting of events: generating more revenue: gaining 
support from alumni, corporations and boosters: earmarking all income for athletic 
grants-in-aid: and improving fund raising.
CEO's w ere asked what percentage of control they had over the athletics program 
at their institution. The mode was 100“ o having been selected by 74° o o f the respondents 
revealing that a sizable majority o f CEO's felt that they have complete control over their 
athletics program. An additional 21% selected either 95° o or 90% level of control.
Table 16 shows that the most common strategy named by chief executive officers 
to establish or reestablish institutional control, listed 43 times, related to the athletics 
director, most commonly to the appointment o f the AD (mentioned 18 times». Comments 
in this regard ranged from noting the importance of hiring a strong athletics director, to 
hiring one w ho supports the overall mission of the institution, who is competent, w ho is 
in clear agreement with the CEO on goals and standards, who understands athletics must 
be managed as a business, who has integrity, w ho is a leader, or w ho shares the CEO's 
values. The reporting line of the athletics director was mentioned eleven times: the 
comment o f all eleven CEO's who specified this was that the athletics director should 
report directly to the CEO.
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Table 16: Strategies to Establish Control
Question (to CEO's): "Name three strategies that you have used to establish control of 
athletics."
Response Frequency Percent
Athletics Director 43 21%
Compliance 19 9%
Policy. Procedures. Goals 19 9%
Financial 16 8%
Athletics Council 15 7%
President 12 6%
Audits, Reviews, etc. 12 6%
Education 10 5%
Communication 10 5%
Faculty Athletics Rep 9 4%
Hiring & Firing 9 4%
Boosters 7 3%
Conferences and NCAA 5 2%
Contracts 5 2%
Board of Regents 4 2%
Coaches 3 1%
Athletics Department 3 1%
Totals 201 100%
The data in Table 16 shows that the second most common strategy used by chief 
executive officers to establish or reestablish institutional control was compliance related. 
Compliance-related strategies were listed 19 times: specific actions listed included 
adding a full time compliance officer, making sure the executive council fully supports 
institutional control, and taking swift action when needed. Other comments related to 
developing a strong compliance office emphasizing institutional control, constant 
reinforcing of policy, encouraging broad-based participation, implementing strong 
monitoring policies, and establishing accountability.
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Financial &  Operational Policies 
Various financial and operational policies have been identified as potential 
influences on the institutional control of athletics. According to a study conducted by 
Mitchell Raibom ( 1974). the budgetary process was considered valuable to the planning 
and control of athletic operations by 84° o of all respondents in his study.
An operational policy that includes self-study and evaluation o f the intercollegiate 
athletics programs is considered a necessity by the N CAA which mandates such an 
undertaking for member institutions at least once every five years (NCAA Manual 1997- 
98). The results of this study indicate that the majority o f  institutions conduct 
comprehensive self-studies and do so at least once every five years. However. 8°o of 
CEO's and 6% of AD's reported that their schools did not conduct such a self-study and 
evaluation.
An external peer review of the athletics program has been identified by the 
NCAA as a method to gauge the level of institutional control over the athletics 
department. The NCAA states:
The involvement in the certification program of peer reviewers who are 
external to the institution is designed to verity and evaluate the 
methodology and results of the institutional self-study. Peer reviewers 
shall verify that the self-study process was characterized by campus-wide 
participation and that the self-study report reflects accurately the 
operation o f the athletics program. Peer reviewers also shall evaluate the 
institution's athletic program in relation to a set o f  fundamental operating 
principles " (NCAA Manual. 1997-98. p. 47).
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In response to the survey, l9“ o o f AD's and 13% o f CEO's said that their schools have not 
conducted external peer rev iews o f the athletics program.
Another policy element o f institutional control is based on an institution hav ing 
an articulated set of goals concerning the athletics program. According to Thelin ( 1989), 
presidents face a serious confusion o f roles in matters o f athletics policy and 
administration. To solve this problem, he said, "Each institution should clearly define its 
purpose and should incorporate this definition into a statement as a pronouncement of its 
role in the educational world" (p. 96). The results o f the study showed that the majority 
of institutions have a set of goals concerning the athletics program; however. ll°o  of 
.AD's and 7% of CEO's reported that their institutions do not.
Admissions and academic policies are another area o f concern. Michener ( 1976 ) 
reported that "the temptation to recruit young men skilled at games but totally unfitted 
for academic work is overpowering" (p. 189). A former CEO of Harvard University. 
Derek Bok {1983). expressed the opinion that some universities were admitting more and 
more athletes whose educational backgrounds and aptitudes were so low that they have 
little chance of academic success. Athletes, said Simon ( 1985 ), should also be students 
who are academically qualified to be in the university, who make satisfactory academic 
progress, and who graduate with meaningful academic skills. The NCAA has mandated 
that "intercollegiate athletics programs shall be maintained as a vital component of the 
educational program, and student-athletes shall be an integral part of the student body.
The admission, academic standing, and academic progress o f student-athletes shall be 
consistent with the policies and standards adopted by the institution for the student body 
in general" ( NCAA Manual 1997-98. p. 4). However, as indicated by the figures in
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Table 17. a significant number o f institutions may not be complying with this directive
since 2U°o o f A D ’s and 13% o f CEO’s reported that athletes at their schools are not
expected to meet the same admissions requirements as the general student body.
Table 17; Admission Requirements for Athletes
Question; "Are all athletes expected to meet the same admission requirements as the 
iieneral student bodv?"
Response Yes No Totals
Athletics Director Frequency 115 29 144
Percent 80% 20% 100%
Chief Executive Officer Frequency 87 13 100
Percent 87% 13% 100%
According to Hardy and Berryman ( 1982). colleges and athletics have frequently 
lacked clearly defined goals regarding athletics; Scott ( 1982) also observed that 
institutions need to clarity their philosophy and objectives concerning athletics. Most 
respondents to the survey confirmed that their schools have clearly articulated mission 
statements pertaining to the role o f athletics; 3% o f AD's and 8° o of CEO’s replied that 
their schools do not have mission statements concerning the role of athletics.
Another element which can influence institutional control relates to the 
establishment o f an athletics board. The function o f a faculty athletics board or 
committee according to Sack [ 1982). is to give priority to the educational needs o f 
student athletes; athletic competition, he maintained, should be limited to schools that 
are equal ly committed to the educational model o f sport. Most respondents ( 9 1 ° o o f 
CEO's and 94% o f AD's ) confirmed that an athletics board has been established at their 
schools
However, the role o f the board is limited to an advisorv one accordinu to the
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majority o f respondents —  83° o o f CEO’s and 81 ° o o f AD’s. Frey (1982) criticized 
institutions that have advisory-only committees as did Thelin ( 1989) who summed up the 
objection by saving that a board without authority to make decisions was like playing 
basketball without keeping score.
Table 18: Role o f the Board 
Question: Is the role o f the board advisorv oniv?
Response Yes No Totals
Chief Executive Officer Frequency 114 26 140
Percent 81% 19% 100%
Athletics Director Frequency 85 17 102
Percent 83% 17% 100%
Another element that impacts institutional control is the level o f financial support 
provided to the athletics department to be considered self sufficient. Riley and Baldridge 
( 1977) and Nyquist (1979) have charged that universities have pushed athletic 
departments into external partnerships because institutional budgets for athletics have not 
kept pace with costs which have steadily increased and have even doubled in as little as 
ten years. Athletic departments have had to seek revenue from external groups, who. in 
turn, desire control (Atwell, Crimes & Lopiano. 1980). According to Frey ( 1994). 
"External coalitions provide the resources necessary to maintain the department's 
operational livelihood and to keep it from being a resource drain on the larger 
organization " ( p. 6).
The figures in Table 19 indicate that almost half o f the institutions did not 
provide enough financial support to the athletics department for it to be considered self 
sufficient. This implies that the other half o f the institutions find it necessary to turn to 
other sources including those outside of the university in order to obtain the funds that
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are necessary to support their athletics programs. Table 20 presents the data concerning
the percentage o f the annual athletics budget that was reported to have come from
institutional or state funds and the percentage that came from other funding.
Table 19: Financial Support to the Athletics Department
Statement: "Your institution provides enough financial support to the athletics
department for it to be considered self-sufficient."
Strongly Strongly
Response Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Disagree Totals
Athletics Director Frequency 20 44 11 46 17 138
Percent 14% 32% 8% 33% 12% 100%
Chief Executive Officer Frequency 9 35 8 36 14 102
Percent 9% 34% 8% 35% 14% 100%
Table 20: Percentage o f Athletics Budget from Institutional or State Funds
Question ( asked o f CEO's ): "What percentage of the athletic budget comes from
institutional anchor state funds?"
Percentage of Budget Frequency Percent
0 14 14%
90% 14 14%
80% 13 13%
30% 11 11%
40% 9 9%
20% 8 8%
70% 8 8%
60% 7 7%
10% 5 5%
50% 4 4%
100% 4 4%
5% 1 1%
25% 1 1%
45% 1 1%
Totals 100 100%
The chief executive officers reported that an average o f 49% of their annual 
athletics budget comes from institutional anchor state funds. The conclusion follows that 
the remaining 51° 0 o f the athletics budget, on average, comes from other sources o f
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
98
funding —  either successful athletic programs or successful donation drives.
Another element o f institutional control is whether the institution conducts an 
independent financial audit o f the athletics department at least once a year. The NCAA 
has mandated that;
A ll expenditures for or in behalf o f a Division I member institution's 
intercollegiate athletics program, including those by any outside 
organization, agency or group o f individuals, shall be subject to an annual 
financial audit conducted for the institution by a qualified auditor who is 
not a staff member o f the institution and who is selected either by the 
institution's chief executive officer or by an institutional administrator 
from outside the athletics department designated by the chief executive 
officer (NCAA 1997-98 Division 1 Manual, p. 48).
The responses to the questionnaire indicated that almost all o f the institutions conduct an 
independent financial audit o f the athletics department at least once a year: only I “ o of 
AD's and 2° o of CEO's reported that this was not done.
Another circumstance that affects institutional control exists when a foundation 
whose control is external to the institution provides monetary support to the athletics 
program. A popular solution to financial problems is to solicit donations from outside 
sources (Frey. 1982; Thelin. 1989). Thelin reported that these foundations, associations, 
and fund-raising groups exist with limited accountability to the host institution. Sperber 
( 1990 ) also has reported that booster clubs have "an amazing degree o f autonomy from 
the university ' ( p. 74). In addition, according to Frey, booster clubs have tended to move 
athletics increasingly a wav from academic and educational concerns. The results o f this
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
99
study showed that those athletics programs which were provided with monetary support 
by foundations whose control is external to the institution were a minority. Nevertheless, 
there were enough o f them to pose a potential problem. Table 21 presents the data 
concerning external foundations.
Table 21 : Monetary Support from External Foundations 
Question; "Do external foundations provide monetary support?"
Response Yes No Totals
Athletics Director Frequency
Percent
42
29%
101
71%
143
100%
Chief Executive Officer Frequency
Percent
38
36%
67
64%
105
100%
Another element o f institutional control concerns the establishment o f 
informational and educational programs for student-athletes regarding the rules that they 
must follow. These programs are needed, according to Sack (1979), because "athletes 
are expected to handle the same course loads and to maintain the same academic 
standards as regular college students. It is not surprising, given the strains inherent in the 
scholar- athlete role, that athletes have been found to be more likely than regular students 
to cheat, to take easy courses, and to seek out other academic short cuts” (p. 60). Table 
22 presents the data on whether informational and educational programs for student- 
athletes regarding rules that thev must follow have been established.
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Table 22: Educational Programs for Student-Athletes
Question: "Are informational and educational programs regarding the rules established 
for student-athletes?"
Strongly
Response Agree Agree Neutral Totals
Frequency 94 48 2 143
Percent 90% 10% 0% 100%
The data in Table 22 indicates that the majority (90°o) o f institutions have 
established informational and educational programs for student-athletes regarding the 
rules that they must follow. Ten percent, unfortunately, have not done so.
The NCAA requires that institutions have in place procedures for self-reporting 
NCAA violations (NCAA Guide to Rules Compliance 1997-98). Almost all AD's 
reported that their institutions identify and report to the NCAA instances in which 
compliance has not been achieved.
The NCAA has recommended that an internal monitoring system be instituted in 
order to ensure compliance with NCAA rules (Principles o f Institutional Control as 
Prepared bv the NCAA Committee on Infractions. 1996) Again, responses showed that 
almost all institutions had a comprehensive monitonng program to ensure rules 
compliance.
Institutions are required by the NCAA to have a meaningful compliance 
education program provided for personnel engaged in athletics-related operations 
(Principles o f Institutional Control as Prepared bv the NCAA Committee on Infractions.
1996). Survey results indicated that almost all institutions had a comprehensive NCAA- 
rules-and- regulations education program for the athletics department
Although the NCAA has not mandated that Division I institutions have a full time
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compliance officer, it places the burden o f proof on institutions "to demonstrate control 
o f their athletics programs and the effectiveness o f compliance sy stems with concrete 
examples o f implementation and effectively functioning compliance systems" ( Principles 
o f Institutional Control: NCAA Guide to Rules Compliance, p. 6). The Principles o f 
Institutional Control, as prepared by the NCAA Committee on Infractions, lists examples 
o f lack o f institutional control related to personnel responsible for compliance. These 
examples are as follows:
1. A person with compliance responsibilities fails to establish a proper 
system for compliance or fails to monitor the operations o f a compliance 
system appropriately.
2. A person with compliance responsibilities does not take steps to alter the 
system o f compliance when there are indications the system is not 
working.
3 A supervisor with overall responsibility for compliance, in assigning
duties to subordinates, so divides responsibilities that, as a practical 
matter, no one is, or appears to be. directly in charge.
4. Compliance duties are assigned to a subordinate who lacks sufficient
authority to have the confidence or respect o f others 
These examples indicate that the responsibility for compliance should belong to one 
person who does not share coaching responsibilities. This study indicates that this is the
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case at the majority o f institutions: however, 16% o f AD’s and 18% o f CEO's responded 
that their schools did not have a full-time compliance officer.
Boosters & Alumni
A difficult element o f controlling the intercollegiate athletics program concerns 
the involvement o f alumni and boosters. Sperber ( 1990) indicated that the booster 
problem is worse than ever: "It's become especially acute because institutions must 
attempt to obtain financial support from booster organizations and then worry about 
turning over control o f their programs to these same people” (p. 79). Hart-Nibbrig and 
Cottingham (1989) have also said that the influence o f boosters is difficult to control.
This is easy to understand because, according to Frey ( 1982). a unit which does not have 
the support o f the booster element does not usually survive politically or economically: if  
a booster organization can provide the money, then it can also command some power in 
athletic decision making. In fact, according to Sperber ( 1990). any effort to control the 
booster groups has been largely superficial since the need for the resources these groups 
provide is so great: "Boosters are usually can-do business types and the distinction 
between ethical conduct and succeeding by any means is often unclear to them. When 
this syndrome is combined with their sense of ownership of a college sports team and 
their desire to see that team win at any cost, they ignore NCAA and all other rules” (p.
79).
Despite the difficulty in controlling external groups or individuals, such as 
boosters and alumni, the NCAA has mandated that the institutions are responsible for 
these groups. The 1997-98 NCAA Manual states that" an institution's "responsibility "
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for the conduct o f its intercollegiate athletics program shall include responsibility for the 
acts o f an independent agency or organization when a member o f the institution's 
executive or athletics administration, or an athletics department staff member, has 
knowledge that such agency or organization is promoting the institution s intercollegiate 
athletics program" (NCAA Manual. 1997-98, p. 49).
A place to start when considering booster involvement in athletics is to determine 
i f  the boosters and alumni o f an institution are supportive o f presidential authority This 
support cannot be assumed considering the need for money at many institutions and the 
control that could be ceded to receive that money (Frey, 1982).
Table 23; Boosters and Alumni Support o f Presidential Authority
Response
Strongly
Agree Agree Neutral Disagree
Strongly
Disagree Totals
Athletics Director Frequency 70 60 13 1 0 144
Percent 49% 42% 9% 1% 0% 100%
Chief Executive Officer Frequency 48 48 8 2 1 107
Percent 45% 45% 7% 2% 1% 100%
The figures in Table 23 show that a majority o f both chief executive officers and 
athletics directors agreed that boosters and alumni o f their institution are supportive o f 
presidential authonty : 90% o f presidents and 91 ° o o f athletics directors either strongly 
agreed or agreed that boosters and alumni of their institution are supportive o f 
presidential authority.
Even if  boosters and alumni are supportive o f presidential authority, are they 
necessarily committed to NCAA rules education and compliance? Hart-Nibbrig and 
Cottingham ( 1989 ) reported many violations o f NCAA rules initiated by boosters; these 
included giving money to players according to their performance on the field, paying the
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college costs o f the sisters o f a potential recruit, supplying the use o f an apartment to a 
recruit at a reduced rent, providing free room and board for recruits; providing 
transportation for recruits, and offering money in exchange for a letter o f intent to attend 
a university. Sperber ( 1990) has stated that the stories o f boosters giving recruits and 
college athletes illegal gifts are legion. He reported that in the history o f the NCAA's 
policing o f intercollegiate athletics, almost half o f the approximately two thousand 
penalties have involved boosters abetting coaches in various violations ( p. 79). The 
results o f this study showed that a majority o f chief e.xecutive officers and athletics 
directors either strongly agreed (45°o and 37% respectively) or agreed (45°o and 54%) 
that boosters and alumni o f their institution are committed to NCAA rules education and 
compliance. Although almost no one disagreed with the statement concerning booster 
and alumni commitment, a relatively large group o f both CEO's (8“o) and AD's 1 15%) 
were undecided about the issue. This may be interpreted as indicating a degree of 
concern about the actual level o f booster and alumni commitment to rules education and 
compliance.
Another question relating to boosters and alumni concerns the establishment of 
informational and educational programs in order to inform athletics boosters o f the 
limitations on their activities under NCAA rules and of the penalties that can arise i f  they 
are responsible for rule violations. The NCAA has recommended that such informational 
and educational programs be established (Principles o f Institutional Control as Prepared 
bv the NCAA Committee on Infractions. 1996). Response to this question was 
definitive: 96% o f respondents either strongly agreed or agreed that such programs had 
been established at their schools.
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On a related issue, the NCAA has mandated that an institution is responsible for 
the acts o f an independent agency or organization promoting the institution's 
intercollegiate athletics program (NCAA Manual. 1997-98). I f  the institution is 
responsible for the actions o f external foundations or booster groups, then it is relevant 
for the institution to determine i f  these organizations exist; 29° o o f AD's and 36*^  o o f 
CEO's replied that these external organizations exist at their schools. Thelin ( 1994 ) 
reported that these foundations, associations, and fund-raising groups exist with limited 
accountability to the host institution. Unfortunately, these organizations, with their 
limited accountability , have gotten their institutions in trouble for various NCAA rules 
violations (Simon. 1985. p. 127).
Since the schools are responsible for the actions o f these external foundations, an 
attempt should be made to bring these organizations under the control of the institution.
At a minimum, attempts at education for these external booster groups should be made in 
order to relate the potential problems facing the school i f  NCAA rules are violated.
Hart-Nibbng and Cottingham ( 1989) have stated that to the extent that 
universities must appeal to the public for funds, they can hardly resolve the systematic 
pressures associated with intercollegiate athletics. Frey (1982) stated that "the truth o f 
the matter is that presidents, faculty, and students will always lose the control battle 
because they do not have the resources to compete with those available to the booster 
coalition" (p. 225 ). External funds are necessary for athletics programs because 
legislative appropnations. university budgets, and gate receipts do not provide sufficient 
funds for a high-level program (Atwell, 1980; Frey, 1982). The results o f this study- 
showed that the majority o f institutions rely on funds generated from boosters and
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alumni. This is shown in Tables 24 and 25;
Table 24; Monetary Support from External Athletics Foundations 
Question; "Do external foundations provide monetary support to the athletic program?'
Response Yes No Totals
Athletics Director Frequency
Percent
31
22%
111
78%
142
100%
Chief Executive Officer Frequency
Percent
32
30%
74
70%
106
100%
Table 25; Funds Generated from Boosters and Alumni
Statement; "The athletic department relies on funds generated from boosters and 
alumni.”
Response
Strongly
Agree Agree Neutral Disagree
Strongly
Disagree Totals
Athletics Director Frequency 29 52 10 44 9 144
Percent 20% 36% 7% 31% 6% 100%
Chief Executive Officer Frequency 17 36 5 37 12 107
Percent 16% 34% 5% 35% 11% 100%
Do boosters and alumni o f institutions expect the athletics department to have 
winning programs? Funk (1991) stated that coaches are under intense pressure from 
alumni to produce victories (p. 89). This pressure could cause some coaches to use any 
means to secure victories. Table 26 presents the related data.
Table 26; Expectations o f Boosters and Alumni 
Statement; "Boosters and alumni expect to have winning programs. "
Response
Strongly
Agree Agree Neutral Disagree
Strongly
Disagree Totals
Athletics Director Frequency 40 93 7 3 1 144
Percent 28% 65% 5% 2% 1% 100%
Chief Executive Officer Frequency 29 69 2 1 1 102
Percent 28% 68% 2% 1% 1% 100%
Guttman ( 1988) contended that alumni, who are not always concerned with
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excellence in the classroom, have been known to give generously to purchase athletic 
greamess: it is common knowledge, he said, that alumni and state legislators are more 
generous to their alma mater when the football team has done well (p. 73). Survey 
respondents were split on the issue o f whether or not boosters and alumni would 
contribute to a losing program. Although over half felt that boosters would contribute 
regardless o f the programs success. 2 l “o o f AD’s and 22^o of CEO’s felt that the 
contributions relied on a winning program. A substantial number (20% and 22° o) neither 
agreed or disagreed indicating again an uncertainty or ambivalence about boosters.
Table 27: Booster &  Alumni Contributions 
Statement: "Boosters and alumni will not contribute unless the athletic programs win."
Response
Strongly
Agree Agree Neutral Disagree
Strongly
Disagree Totals
Athletics Director Frequency 3 28 29 77 7 144
Percent 2% 19% 20% 53% 5% 100%
Chief Executive Officer Frequency 2 21 23 52 8 106
Percent 2% 20% 22% 49% 8% 100%
Funk ( 1991 ) reported that coaches are under intense pressure from alumni to 
produce victories. Lapchick ( 1996) declared that the number one rule that mattered was 
winning: the coaches who followed this rule, he said, stayed at their schools for long 
periods of time —  no one pointed a finger at the coaches unless they lost. Hart-Nibbrig 
and Cottingham ( 1989) pointed out that even at the Ivy League universities, coaches can 
be fired for sustaining a losing tradition. Primary sources o f this widespread pressure to 
w in are boosters and alumni. This is reflected in the study results which showed that 
only 30°'o of CEO's and 32% AD's disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement 
that boosters and alumni o f an institution expect coaches with losing records to be fired.
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Once again, a sizable number o f respondents (29°o and 33%) indicated uncertainty or
indecision by choosing to remain "neutral."
Table 28; Boosters Expectations Regarding Coaches
Statement: "Boosters and alumni of your institution expect coaches with losing
records to be fired."
Strongly Strongly
Response Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Disagree Totals
Athletics Director Frequency 4 45 48 41 6 144
Percent 3% 31% 33% 28% 4% 100%
Chief Executive Officer Frequency 5 38 31 29 3 106
Percent 5% 36% 29% 27% 3% 100%
Summary
The results o f this study indicated that governing boards, chief executive officers, 
and athletics directors were taking steps to support institutional control o f Division 1 
athletics. Most governing boards had written mission statements in which they have 
defined the role o f athletics at their school: they had also articulated the authonty o f the 
chief executive officer in a mission statement and are supportive o f that authority as were 
the athletics directors.
CEO's and AD's have been making it clear that they demand compliance with 
NCAA rules. The institutions have been conducting independent financial audits o f the 
athletics department, establishing faculty athletics boards, creating clearly articulated 
mission statements concerning the role o f athletics, creating articulated sets o f goals 
concerning the athletic program, conducting peer reviews o f the athletics department, 
and conducting comprehensive self-study and evaluation o f the athletics program. The 
CEO's have also separated the Athletics Directors from coaching responsibilities for the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
109
majority o f institutions.
Comprehensive NCAA rules-education programs have been established as have 
informational and educational programs for boosters and student-athletes. Monitoring 
programs have been set up to ensure that rules compliance has been established and 
institutions have identified and reported to the NCA A  instances in which compliance has 
not been achieved.
Despite these successes in the institutional control o f athletics, there were areas 
o f concern that were identified by this study.
Pressures to W in. There were a number o f pressures placed on coaches to have 
winning and successful programs. The data in Table 3 showed that governing boards 
expect athletics departments to have winning programs. Data in Table 6 and Table 7 
reflected the fact that athletics directors expected coaches to have winning programs as 
their highest priority and Table 31 showed that boosters and alumni also expect the 
athletics department to have winning programs.
The fact that governing boards, athletics directors, and boosters expected coaches 
to have winning programs does not necessarily mean that coaches will cheat. However.
It did reflect pressure on a coach to win. Combined with other influences, it could add to 
the temptation for a coach to cheat to win.
The results o f the study also indicated that the athletics directors and coaches felt 
that the stability their position depends on having winning programs. The data in Table 8 
show ed that a large number o f athletics directors believed the stability of their position 
depends on having winning programs. Tables 9 and 10 indicated that Olympic sports 
coaches as well as football and basketball coaches believe the stability of their positions
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depends on having a winning program That belief is easy to understand —  the data in 
Table 26 indicated that boosters and alumni o f an institution expect coaches with losing 
records to be fired. On top o f that, as the information in Tables 11 and 12 showed the 
contracts o f some coaches contain athletics-performance clauses that could cause the 
contracts to be non-renewed. Such clauses increase the nsk that coaches might feel 
enough pressure to do anything to win.
On the one hand, CEO's and AD's educate and expect coaches to follow NCAA  
rules. On the other hand there is substantial pressure on coaches to have winning 
programs. W ill the coach be fired for breaking NCAA rules —  or for losing? This is a 
dilemma that not only causes problems for coaches but for the concept o f institutional 
control o f athletics as well.
Reliance on External Funds: Another issue raised by the data in this study was 
the reliance on external monies to help fund the activities o f the athletics departments.
The data in Table 25 indicated that athletics departments rely to a great extent on funds 
generated from boosters and alumni. Also, as the information in Table 19 showed half 
of the respondents indicated that their institution did not provide enough financial 
support to the athletics department for it to be considered self sufficient. More 
specifically, the data in Tables 20 and 21 showed that CEO's and AD's agreed that only 
half o f the athletics department budget came from the institution. This implies that the 
other half came from external funding.
Athletics finance was a concern for the chief executive officer. The data in 
Table 15 showed that CEO's rate money, funding, resources, and financing as the second 
greatest threat to institutional control. Inadequate financial resources, dependence on
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financial support from boosters, budget difficulties, cost increases, the need to produce 
income, and the lack o f institutional funding were all identified as threats to institutional 
control.
The methods recommended by CEO’s to reduce the impact o f finance-related 
concerns on athletic control included establishing a balance between self-generated 
revenue and institutional funds: improving o f events promotion: generating more 
revenue: gaining support from alumni, corporations, and boosters: and improving fund 
raising. However, the suggested solutions create a paradox —  the solution to one 
problem creates another. The NCAA has mandated that an institution is responsible for 
the acts o f an independent agency or organization promoting the school’s intercollegiate 
athletics program (NCAA Manual. 1997-98). Nevertheless, the data in Tables 21.24. 
and 25 showed that some external athletic foundations or booster organizations not under 
the direct control o f their institution do exist in order to support and provide money to 
the institution. The paradox consists o f how to satisfy the need for financial help from 
boosters and alumni on one hand while also keeping external forces from either 
controlling or causing the institution trouble by breaking NCAA rules.
Faculty Athletics Board: Survey results showed that the majontv o f institutions 
have either a board that is in control of athletics or an athletics advisory board. However, 
the data in Tables 18 and 19 also showed that the role o f the board is advisory only. 
Institutions cannot expect their faculty to help with the control o f athletics if  they do not 
allow the faculty board to have authority beyond the merely advisory role.
Admitting Student-Athletes Under Different Criteria: The NCAA has mandated 
that "intercollegiate athletics programs shall be maintained as a vital component of the
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educational program, and student-athletes shall be an integral part o f the student body. 
The admission, academic standing, and academic progress o f student-athletes shall be 
consistent with the policies and standards adopted by the institution for the student body 
in general" (NCAA Manual 1997-98. p. 4). However, the data in Table 17 showed 13% 
o f the chief executive officers and 24% o f the athletics directors said their institutions 
did admit athletes under different requirements as the general student body. This policy 
could signal that the institution treats athletes on a different standard than regular 
students.
While the status o f a number o f the areas looked at in the study proved to be 
satisfactory, other areas were shown to need improving i f  institutional control o f athletics 
is to become a realitv at all NCAA Division I schools.
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CHAPTER 5
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
FOR FURTHER STUDY
Introduction
The purpose of this investigation was to determine the current status of 
institutional control of athletics at NCAA Division I colleges and universities and to 
determine w here problems with control lie. This was done through the use o f a sur\ ey 
designed to collect information pertaining to the individual elements and conditions that 
have been determined to impact on self-govemance. These include the actions and 
policies o f the chief executive officer who is the person ultimately responsible for control 
of the institution intercollegiate athletics. They also include certain actions and beliefs 
by the institution’s governing board, its athletics director, and its boosters and alumni. In 
addition, financial and operational policies of the institution can affect the control of 
athletics.
A questionnaire was mailed to the CEO's and AD's o f the 275 NCAA Division 1 
schools listed in the 1996-97 National Directory o f Colleue Athletics. The results from 
the returned surveys were presented and analyzed in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 summarizes 
the findings derived from the results o f this study and the implications for institutional
113
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control of athletics. It also suggests further studies in the area o f institutional control o f 
athletics.
Implications
The findings o f this study pointed out a number o f implications concerning the 
institutional control o f athletics as it relates to the NCAA which instituted the concept in 
an effort to attain its ultimate goal o f compliance with its rules and regulations. The 
survey results indicated that there are weaknesses in the exercise o f institutional control 
that can be addressed in order to strengthen control at a number o f institutions.
The governing board and its actions affect the exercise o f institutional control in 
several important areas. The boards at some schools still need to take action to support 
institutional control by writing mission statements clearly defining the role o f athletics 
and endorsing the authoritv o f the CEO concerning athletics. Governing boards must 
also take action to define their expectations concerning the athletics program and to 
decide what amount o f money is needed to meet those expectations.
CEO’s should encourage their boards to take these steps if  they have not already 
done so. In addition, before taking a new position as CEO. the candidate should ensure 
that a mission statement addressing these concerns exists and that it is clearly worded 
and realistic. Care should be taken not only that expectations are defined and are 
realistic but that sufficient funds are budgeted so that goals and expectations can 
reasonably be accomplished. If  this is not the case, the implication for the CEO’s is that 
they may be in a position in which the control o f athletics and NCAA rules compliance 
for which they are responsible is difficult or impossible.
The study results indicated that governing boards expected institutions to have
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winning programs: at the same time, most programs were shown to be underfunded In 
addition, it was indicated that approximately 50®b o f annual budgets for athletics came 
from external funding, a situation that leaves the institution in the position o f being 
compromised by external organizations including boosters and alumni who may seek to 
exercise a degree o f control o f the athletic programs to which they contribute. CEO's in 
the study identified funding-related issues as a primary threat to their institutional 
control The CEO would be well advised to avoid or to take actions to alleviate those 
situations where there are conflicts between expectations and funding o f athletics 
programs.
The study revealed the good news that coaches are expected to follow the rules 
dictated by the NCAA, and their education in this regard was the most common strategv 
used in efforts to establish institutional control o f athletics. Unfortunately, the study 
indicated that these same coaches are frequently under a great deal o f pressure to win. 
Athletics directors commonly felt that the stability o f their jobs and of the coaches’jobs 
depended on having winning programs. Boosters and alumni expect losing coaches to be 
fired. On top of that, one quarter o f the institutions that responded indicated that 
athletics performance clauses that could cause the contracts to be non-renewed were 
included in the contracts o f their coaches. An unavoidable question anses: W ill a coach 
lose his job faster for cheating or for losing? This situation must be corrected if  
institutional control o f athletics is to be successful.
The existence o f a strong board in control o f athletics could possibly help in 
solving these paradoxes and the problems that face intercollegiate athletics leadership 
today. Unfortunately, study responses indicated that the role of this board in a majoritv'
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o f institutions was not to establish policies or to make policy decisions; it was advisory 
only. Changing this could be an effective starting place for institutions looking for ways 
to improve their control o f athletics. Other recommendations follow.
Recommendations
The results o f this study suggest a number o f possible changes in policies, 
procedures, and attitudes in order to improve the degree o f institutional control o f 
athletics at NCAA Division I intercollegiate athletic institutions. These recommended 
changes include:
1. Governing boards o f all institutions should create a mission statement 
concerning the role o f athletics and use it as a guideline for consistency.
2. Governing boards, chief executive officers, and athletics directors should 
reconsider their expectations and policies towards winning athletics 
departments or programs. The study showed an alarming attitude on the 
part o f boards, CEO's, and AD's that contributes to the pressure placed on 
coaches to have winning programs. They should do their best to help 
eliminate the belief by athletics directors and coaches that the stability o f 
their positions depends on having a winning program.
3. Athletics performance clauses that could cause contracts to be non- 
renewed should be eliminated: the attitude that a coach will be fired 
quicker by having a losing program than by breaking NCAA rules is one 
that should be eliminated.
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The governing board and chief executive officer should consider the 
financial commitment given to the athletics program; the athletics 
department should not have to rely on funds generated from boosters and 
alumni. The level o f expectation for success should be determined by the 
institution and funded accordingly.
All institutions should eliminate special admission policies and standards 
designed only for student athletes.
6. The role o f the board in control o f athletics or o f the athletics advisory 
board should be expanded to include policy decisions and the reviewing of 
all athletic administrative and coaching hires.
7. External athletics support foundations be brought under the direct control 
of the institution.
Recommendations for Further Study
1. It is recommended that a study be conducted to determine why the 
majority o f athletics directors are directly supervised by the chief 
e.xecutive officer.
2. It IS recommended that a follow-up study be done concerning mission 
statements defining the role o f intercollegiate athletics in order to 
determine what these mission statements consist of. Also the number o f 
institutions that do not have mission statements should be updated.
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3. Il is recommended that a study be conducted to obtain more detailed
information about the expectations o f hav ing winning athletics programs 
and the effects o f these expectations on athletics.
4. It is recommended that a study be conducted on the reliance on external
flmding to finance the operation o f athletics departments in order to 
identify ways that financial support can be generated without giv ing up 
control and ways to generate loyalty based on the institution instead o f on 
the success o f the athletics department.
5. It is recommended that a study be done on the admission policies o f
institutions for student-athletes.
6. It is recommended that a study be conducted to determine the reasons why
institutions have athletics performance clauses that could cause the 
contracts o f coaches to be non-renewed: to determine exactly what these 
clauses consist of: and to determine whether or not they promote a win-at- 
all-costs attitude.
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APPENDIX I  
SURVEY FOR CHIEF EXE C U TIV E  OFHCERS
INSTRUCTIONS: Following are statements regarding elanents of institutional control of 
athletics that may or may not exist at your institiition. Please complete each question as 
instructed. YOUR RESPONSES W ILL  BE KEPT STR IC TLY CO N FID EN TIA L.
I. Demographic Information
1. Name of Institution:
2. How many years have you been chief executive officer of this institution?
3. Who is the direct supervisor of the athletics director and what position does he or
she hold?
4. Has your institution ever been cited by the NCAA for a violation of 
institutional control o f athletics during your term in office?
Yes__________ N o ___________
5. What percentage of time do you devote for interacting with athletics 
department persoimel concerning issues o f institutional control?
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
n. The Governing Board
6. Does the governing board have a clear mission statement concerning 
the role of athletics at your university. Yes_________ N o _________
7. Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with
the following statements by checking the box under the heading that 
best describe your feelings.
Strongly Un- Strongly
Agree Agree decided Disagree Disagree
The governing board o f your institution_______________  ____  ____
has a clearly articulated mission statement 
concerning the authority o f the presidenL
The governing board is supportive o f   ____  ____  ____  ____
presidential authority at your university.
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The governing board o f your institution_________ ______  ____  ____
expects the athletics department to have 
winning programs.
The governing board provides enough________________  ____  ____
financial support to your institution for 
the athletics department to be self-sufficient
EH. Athletics Director
8. Do the duties of the athletics director include coaching responsibilities?
Yes___________ N o ___________
9. Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with
the following statements by checking the box under the heading that 
best describes your feelings.
Strongly Un- Strongly
Agree Agree deoded Disagree Disagree
The athletics director at your institution_________ ______  ____  ____
is supportive of presidential authority.
The athletics director at yotnr institution ____ ____  ____  ____
is conunitted to NCAA rules education 
and compliance.
The athletics director at your institution.
expects coaches to have winning programs.
The athletics director at your institution  ____  ____  ____  ____
believes the stability of his or her 
position depends on having wirming 
programs.
The athletics director at your institution_________ ______  ____  ____
agrees with the educational goals of the 
school.
The athletics director at your institution________ ______  ____  ____
makes clear that he or she demands 
compliance with NCAA rules and that 
they w ill not tolerate those who deliberately 
violate the rules or do so through gross 
negligence.
IV . Athletics Department
10. Does the athletics department at your institution have a full time compliance officer?
Yes___________N o ___________
11. Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following 
statements by checking the box under the heading that best describes your feelings.
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Strongly Un- Strongly
Agree Agree decided Disagree Disagree
Coaches at your institution are _  
committed to NCA A  rules compliance.
Football and Basketball coaches at 
your institution believe the stability 
of their positions depend on having 
a winning program.
Olympic coaches (Tennis, soccer, golf,_________ ______  ____  ____
etc.) at your institution believe the 
stabniQr of their positions depend on 
having a winning program.
Coaches at your institution agree with  ____  ____  ____  ____
the educational goals of the school.
Coaches at you institution understand  ____  ____  ____  ____
and adhere to NCAA rules and 
regulations.
Coaches have a clear understanding o f  ____  ____  ____  ____
their role within your university.
V . Alumni and Boosters
12. Do external athletic foundations or booster organizations not under the direct control 
of your institution exist to support your institution’s athletic endeavors?
Yes__________ N o ___________
13. Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the 
following statements by checking the box under the heading that best 
describes your feelings.
Strongly Un- Strongly
Agree Agree dedded Disagree Disagree
Your athletics department relies a great ____  ____  ____  ____  ____
deal on funds generated from boosters 
and alumni.
Boosters and alumni of your institution ____  ____  ____  ____  ____
are supportive of presidential authoriQr.
Boosters and alimmi of your institution ____  ____  ____  ____  ____
are committed to NCAA rules education 
and compliance.
Boosters and alumni of your institution ____  ____  ____  ____  ____
expect the athletics department to have 
winning programs.
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Strongly Un- Strongly
Agree Agree dedded Disagree Disagree
Boosters and alumni will not contribute ___  ____ ____ ____ ___
to your tmiversity unless you have wirming 
athletics programs.
Boosters and alumni of your institution ___  ___  ____ ____ ___
expect losing coaches to be fired.
VI. Financial Information
14. Does the athletic operating budget of your institution match the revenue generated? 
Yes________ No__________
15. What percentage of the aimual athletics budget comes from institutional and/or state 
funds?
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
16. Do foundations, whose control is external to the institution, provide 
monetary support to the athletics program at your institution?
Yes________ No_________
17. Does your institution conduct an independent financial audit of the
athletics department at least once a year? Yes________ No_______
18. Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the
following statements by checking the box under the heading that best 
describes your feelings.
Strongly Un- Strongly
Agree Agree dedded Disagree Disagree
Your institution provides enough finan- ___  ___  ____
cial support to the athletics department 
to be considered self sufficient
Your athletics department relies a great ___      _
deal on funds generated from boosters 
and alumni.
VH. The Institution
19. Does your institution have a faculty athletics board?
Yes No_____
20. Is the role of the board in control of athletics or the athletics advisory 
board at your institution to establish athletics policies and to make 
policy decisions? Yes No_____
21. Is the role of the board in control of athletics or the athletics advisory
board of your school advisory only? Yes No_____
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22. Aie the coaching hires at your school reviewed by the Athletics 
Advisory Board? Yes______No______
23. Does your institution have a clearly articulated mission statmnent 
concerning the role of athletics? Yes_________ No__________
24. Are all athletes expected to meet the same admission requirements as the general
student body? Yes_________ No__________
If no, how do the standards differ?
25. What percentage of athletes are admitted to your institution under
different requirements as the general student body?
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
26. Does your institution have an articulated set of goals concerning the
athletics program? Yes No_____
27. Has your institution conducted an external peer review of the athletics 
program? Yes_______ No________
2 8. Does your institution conduct a comprehensive self-study and evaluation of the
intercollegiate athletics programs at least once every five years? Yes_______
No_________
VUE. Institutional Control
29. What is the greatest threat to institutional control of athletics at your institution?
30. What methods have been used to lessen the impact of this threat on institutional 
control?
31. What percentage of institutional control over the athletics program do
you have at your institution?
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
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32. Please name three strategies that you have used to establish or 
reestablish institutional control of athletics?
1.__________________________________________________________________________
2.
3._
33. Please rank in order from a 1 for potentially the greatest threat to an 9 for the least 
threat to institutional control of adiletics at your institution.
a. Governing Board ______
b. Alumni _______
c. Boosters _______
d. Coaches ______
e. AD of school ______
f. Professional agents______
g. NCAA ______
h. Student Athletes ______
i. Other ______
34. Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the 
following statements by checking the box under the heading that best 
describes your feelings.
Strongly Un- Strongly
Agree Agree decided Disagree Disagree
The chief executive officer at your ___  ___  ____ ___  ___
institution makes clear that he or 
she demands compliance with 
NCAA rules and üiat they will not 
tolerate those who deliberately 
violate the rules or do so through 
gross negligence.
35. Is there any aspect regarding institutional control that you wish to add? 
Comments______________________________________________
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APPENDIX n  
SURVEY FOR ATHLETICS DIRECTORS
INSTRUCTIONS: Following are statements regarding elements of institutional control of 
athletics that may or may not exist at your institution. Please complete each question as 
instructed. YOUR RESPONSES WILL BE KEPT STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.
L Demographic Information
1. Name of Institution:
2. How many years have you been athletics director of this institution?
3. Who is the direct supervisor of the athletics director and what position does he or 
she hold?
4. Has your institution been cited by the NCAA for a violation of institutional control
of athletics during your term in office? Yes_________ No__________
5. What percentage of time do you devote with the chief executive 
officer of your institution for issues of institutional control?
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% %100
n . The Governing Board
6. Does the governing board have a mission statement concerning the role 
of athletics at your university? Yes_________ No__________
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7. Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the
following statements by checking the box under the heading that best 
describes your feelings.
Strongly Un- Strongly
Agtee Agree dedded Disagree Disagree
The governing board of your institution 
has a clearly articulated mission statement 
concerning the authority of the president
The governing board is supportive of 
presidential authority at your institution.
The governing board of your institution ___  ___  ___  __
expects the athletics department to have 
winning programs.
HL Athletics Director
8. Do the duties of the athletics director include coaching responsibilities?
Yes_________ No__________
9. Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the 
following statements by checking the box under the heading that best 
describes your feelings.
Strongly Un- Strongly
Agree Agree dedded Disagree Disagree
The athletics director at your institution ____ ___  ___  ____ ____
is supportive of presidential authority.
The athletics director at your institution ___  ____ ___  ____ ____
expects coaches to have winning programs 
as the highest priority.
The athletics director at your institution ___  ___  ___  ____ ____
believes the stability of his or her position 
depends on having wirming athletics programs.
The athletics director at your institution ___  ___  ___  ____ ____
makes clear that he or she demands 
compliance with NCAA rules and that 
they will not tolerate those who deliberately 
violate the rules or do so through gross 
negligence.
rv . Athletics Department
10. Does the athletics department at your institution have a full time NCAA compliance
officer? Yes_________  No__________
11. Do the contracts of Football and Basketball coaches contain athletics performance 
clauses that could cause the contracts to be non-renewed.
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12. Do the contracts of Olympic sports coaches (Tennis, soccer, golf, etc.) contain 
athletics performance clauses üiat could cause the contracts to be non-renewed.
13. Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the 
following statements by checking the box under the heading that best 
describes your feelings.
Strongly Un- Strongly
Agree Agree «txiM Disagree Disagree
Coaches at your institution are commit­
ted to NCAA rules compliance.
Your institution has a comprehensive 
NCAA rules and regulations education 
program for your a&letics departmenL
Your institution has a comprehensive mon­
itoring program to ensure rules compliance.
Your institution identifies and reports to 
the NCAA instances in which compliance 
has not been achieved.
Football and Basketball coaches at your 
institution believe the stabiliQ  ^of their 
positions depend on having a winning 
program.
Olympic sports coaches (Tennis, soccer, 
golf, etc.) at your institution believe 
the stabili^ of their positions 
depend on having a winning program.
Coaches at your institution agree with 
the educational goals of the school
Coaches at your institution understand 
and adhere to NCAA rules and regulations.
Informational and educational programs 
have been established at your institution 
to inform athletics boosters of the 
limitations on their activities under 
NCAA rules.
Informational and educational programs 
are established at your institution for 
student-athletes regarding the rules that 
they must follow.
V. Alumni and Boosters
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14. Do external athletic foundations or booster organizations not under the 
direct control of your institution exist to support your institution’s 
athletic endeavors? Yes__________ No_________
15. Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the 
following statements by checking the box under the heading that best 
describes your feelings.
Strongly Un- Strongly
Agtee Agree dedded Disagree Disagree
Your athletics d^artment relies a great ____ ___  ____ ____ ___
deal on funds generated from boosters 
and alumni.
Boosters and alunmi of your institution ___  ___  ____ ____ ___
are supportive of presidential authority.
Boosters and alumni of your institution ___  ___  ____ ____ ___
are committed to NCAA rules education 
and compliance.
Boosters and alinnni of your institution ____ ___  ____ ____ ___
expect the athletics department to 
have winning programs.
Boosters and alumni wül not contribute ___  ___  ____ ____ ___
to your university unless you have 
winning athletics programs.
Boosters and alunmi of your institution ___  ___  ____ ____ ___
expect coaches with losing records 
to be fired.
VI. Financial Information
16. Does the athletic operating budget of your institution match the revenue 
generated? Yes__________ No_________
17 . What percentage of the annual athletics budget comes from institutional 
and/or state funds?
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
18. Do foundations, whose control is external to the institution, provide 
monetary support to the athletics program at your institution?
Yes_________  No_________
19. Does your institution conduct an independent financial audit of the 
athletics department at least once a year?
Yes_________ No__________
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20. Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the 
following statements by checking the box under the heading that best 
describes your feelings.
Strongly Un- Strongly
Agree Agree dadffefl Disagree Disagree
Your institution provides enough finan- ____ ____ ____ ___  ____
cial support to the athletics department 
to be considered self sufficient
Your athletics department relies a great ____ ___  ____ ___  ____
deal on funds generated from 
boosters and aliunni.
Vn. The Institution
21. Does your institution have a board in control of athletics or an athletics 
advisory board? Yes__________No__________
22. Is the role of the board in control of athletics or the athletics advisory
board at your institution to establish athletics policies and to make policy decisions? 
Yes__________No_________
23. Is the role of the board in control of athletics or the athletics advisory
board of your school advisory only? Yes__________No__________
24. Are the coaching hires at your school reviewed by the board in control 
of athletics or the athletics advisory board? Yes__________ No____
25. Does your institution have a clearly articulated ntission statement 
concerning the role of athletics? Yes__________No________
26. Are athletes expected to meet the same adntission requirements as the
general student body? Yes_________ No__________
If no, how do the standards differ?
27. What percentage of athletes are admitted to your institution under
different requirements as the general student body?
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
28. Does your institution have an articulated set of goals concerning the
athletics program? Yes_________ No__________
29. Has your institution conducted an external peer review of the athletics 
program? Yes__________No__________
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30. Does your institution conduct a comprehensive self-study and
evaluation of the intercoUegiatB athletics programs at least once every 
five years? Yes_________  No__________
V n i. Institutional Control
31. What is the greatest threat to institutional control of athletics at your 
institution?
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32. What methods have been used to lessen the impact of this threat on 
institutional control?
3 3. What percentage of institutional control over the athletics program do
you have at your institution?
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
34. Please name three strategies that you have used to establish or 
reestablish institutional control of athletics?
1. ______________________________________
2.
3.
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35. Please rank in order from a 1 for potentially the greatest threat to an 9 
for the least threat to institutional control of athletics at your institution.
a. Governing Board _______
b. Alumni _______
c. Boosters _______
d. Coaches _______
e. CEO of school _______
f. Professional agents______
g. NCAA _______
h. Student Athletes ______
i. Other__________ _______
Explain other:
36. Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the
following statements by checking the box under the heading that best 
describes your feelings.
Strongly Ifo- Strongly
Agree Agree dedded Disagree Disagree
The chief executive officer at your _
institution makes clear that he or she 
demands compliance with NCAA rules 
and that they will not tolerate those who 
deliberately violate the rules or do so 
through gross negligence.
37. Is there any aspect regarding institutional control that you wish to add? 
Comments____________________________________________________
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APPENDIX m  
COVER LETTER TO CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICERS
Dear Sir or Madam:
As the chief executive officer of an NCAA Division I institution, you are being 
asked to participate in a survey involving the institutional control of athletics. This 
research will be used in my doctoral dissertation in Educational Leadership at the 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas. The topic is "Institutional Control of Division I 
Collegiate Athletics."
At present, the NCAA has developed specific guidelines for the proper institutional 
control of college athletics. However, the NCAA and division I institutions do not 
necessarily know the extent to which these guidelines of institutional control exist in 
Division 1 athletics today. Because of the emphasis placed on institutional control 
of athletics by the NCAA, it is important to gauge its existence. Since the NCAA 
has identified the chief executive officer as ±e responsible individual for 
institutional control, the existence of institutional control is important to you.
ALL RESPONSES WILL BE KEPT STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL!
After completing the questiormaire, please return it in the enclosed self-addressed, 
stamped envelope as soon as possible.
Thank you for your time in taking part in this study. Results will be available upon 
completion of the research. 1 will be happy to send you a suirunary of the findings 
upon your request
Sincerely,
Larry Easley 
185 Webster Way 
Henderson, NV 89014
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APPENDIX IV 
COVER LETTER TO ATHLETICS DIRECTORS
Dear Sir or Madam:
As the athletics director of an NCAA Division I institution, you are being asked to 
participate in a survey involving the institutional control of athletics. This research 
will be used in my doctoral dissertation in Educational Leadership at the Urtiversity 
of Nevada, Las Vegas. The topic is "Institutional Control of Division I Collegiate 
Athletics."
At present, the NCAA has developed specific guidelines for the proper institutional 
control of college athletics. However, the NCAA and division I institutions do not 
necessarily know the extent to which these guidelines of institutional control exist in 
Division I athletics today. Because of the emphasis placed on institutional control 
of athletics by the NCAA, it is important to gauge its existence. Since the NCAA 
has identified the chief executive officer as £e responsible individual for 
institutional control, the existence of institutional control is important to your 
institution.
ALL RESPONSES WILL BE KEPT STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL!
After completing the questiormaire, please return it in the enclosed self-addressed, 
stamped envelope as soon as possible.
Thank you for your time in taking part in this study. Results wiU be available upon 
completion of the research. I will be happv to send vou a summarv of the findings 
upon vour reouesL
Sincerely,
Larry Easley 
185 Webster Way 
Henderson, NV 89014
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APPENDIX V 
FOLLOW-UP LETTER
Dear Sir or Madam:
I need your help!
Recently you received a questionnaire from me regarding "The Institutional Control 
of Division I Athletics." The questiormaire is for my doctoral dissertation research.
According to my records, I have not yet received your response. Since a larger 
number of replies adds to the significance of the study, I would like to get back as 
many as possible.
ALL RESPONSES WILL BE KEPT STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL!
If you have returned your questionnaire, please disregard this letter and accept my 
thanks and appreciation for taking time to participate. If you have misplaced it or it 
simply slipped your mind, please complete it now and return it as soon as possible. 
Another questionnaire and self-addressed, stamped envelope are included for you.
Thank you for your assistance!
Sincerely,
Larry Easley 
185 Webster Way 
Henderson, NV 89014
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